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Abstract 
This report addresses a review of main EU natural gas transmission network facilities. A review of Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) regasification terminals, Underground Gas Storage (UGS) facilities, Compressor Stations 
(CS) and pipelines has been done. Special attention has been paid to identify types , operation modes and 
main types of failures of these facilities. Reasonable ranges of failure frequencies have also  been selected 
from the available literature. The contents of this report are expected to  be  relevant as data sources to  
national and regional Risk Assessments (RA) performed in line with Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 concern ing 
measures to safeguard the security of gas supply. 
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1 Introduction 
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply contains among its  
provisions the obligation to perform Risk Assessments of all national gas systems and of a number of 
regional Risk Groups formed by Member States that share a strong dependence on specif ic natural gas 
sources or on a specific route bringing large quantities of gas to the European Union. Performing these types 
of Risk Assessments (RA), either national or regional, needs a very good understanding of the gas system of 
each country and region, and in particular of their respective gas transmission networks. 
Gas networks, together with Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) cargoes, are the means to bring gas from production 
areas to regions of consumption. Gas networks are typically divided in gas transmission and gas distribution 
networks, attending to the operating pressure and mission. Gas transmission networks typically operate at 
high pressure and transport gas over long distances, while distribution networks operate a low pressure and 
bring gas to the gate of most of the consumers (only a very limited number of large consumers like some gas 
fired power plants and big factories are directly connected to the transmission network).  
Gas transmission networks are the ones most frequently addressed in  a RA in  line with Regulation (EU) 
2017/1938 because of the magnitude of the impact of events that may take place in their many d iffe rent 
facilities and components; the impact of events occurring in distribution networks have much more limited 
consequences. Main elements (facilities and components) of transmission networks are pipelines, compressor 
stations (CS), LNG terminals, Underground Storage (UGS) facilities, metering stations, b lending stations , 
valves, and regulators. 
A RA typically analyses and combines scenarios, their probabilities and consequences. Thus, it is very 
important to understand what the most important elements of the network that may fail are, how they may 
fail, what are their immediate effect on the vicinity of the facility, and how likely this to happen is . Over the 
years, our group has reviewed many national and regional RAs, worked on different networks and 
collaborated with different gas experts from EU Member States. This work has taken us to consider that the 
facilities that demand more attention and whose failures have to be considered as much as possible in  a RA 
are Underground Storage facilities, Liquefied Natural Gas regasification terminals, compressor stations and 
pipelines. 
In this report we focus our attention on the following aspects: 1) identifying and collecting information about 
a significant number of facilities of the types mentioned in the previous paragraph, although not making a 
real inventory because of the unavailability of public  information (in many cases even commercial 
information is scarce), 2) understanding the way each type of facility works, 3) understanding and 
categorising, as much as possible, the types of failures that they are subject to, and 4) whenever possible,  
identifying and selecting likely failure frequencies for the different facilities and failure modes. This last point 
has been particularly difficult because of the scarcity of open literature on the subject.    
This report is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a very brief overview of the EU gas transmission network. 
Section 3 is dedicated to Underground Storage facilities, their types and operation , their components and 
characteristics, and their main failure modes. Section 4 is dedicated to Liquefied Natural Gas regasif ication  
terminals, their main types and operation. A short description is already done of each terminal in operation  in 
the EU. In the last parts of this section failure modes and frequencies of incidents are also addressed. Section 
5 addresses compressor stations, showing types and their operation. A sub-section is dedicated to re liability 
data of a number of types of compressor stations. Section 6 is dedicated to p ipelines , stressing the data 
available on pipeline failures and related frequencies. Finally, section 7 contains the main conclusions of the 
study. Two annexes contain an inventory and some more detailed information about UGS and LNG facilities in 
the EU. 
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2 The European gas transmission network: past and future 
The European gas network has been established gradually during the last 80 years. Initially, the European gas 
system was developed around national gas fields in Southern France, Northern Italy, Germany and Romania . 
In the 1960s the large gas field of Groningen was found in the Netherlands. . It was in  the 1980s that the  
large scale gas import from Norway, Russia and Algeria took over as the main source of gas supply in Europe. 
In the 1990s gas was introduced and developed in Greece, Portugal and Ireland. After 2000 the focus has 
been on connecting the UK gas market to the continent and the Norwegian gas f ields, connecting new 
Member States to the EU-integrated system, creating new import channels as pipelines from North Africa, the 
Caspian Sea and establishing new LNG import facilities. 
In general, the European gas infrastructure is quite young and replacement is not considered a major issue in  
most Member States, while a key focus of the EU’s Energy Union Strategy is ensuring gas can f low easily 
across borders within the Union. During the 1990s, when most national natural gas markets were  sti ll 
monopolised, the European Union and the Member States dec ided to  open these markets gradually to  
competition. The first liberalisation directive (First Energy Package ) for gas was adopted in  1998, to  be 
transposed into Member States’ legal systems by 2000. The Second Energy Package was adopted in 2003, its 
directives to be transposed into national law by Member States by 2004, with some provisions entering into  
force only in 2007. Industrial and domestic consumers were then free to choose their own gas suppliers from 
a wider range of competitors. In April 2009, a Third Energy Package seeking to further liberalise the in ternal 
electricity and gas markets was adopted, amending the second package and providing the cornerstone for the 
implementation of the internal energy market.  
Currently the European internal market is functioning reasonably well. It is considered that around 75% of gas 
in the European Union is consumed within a competitive liquid market (IEA, 2018), in which gas can be flexibly 
redirected across borders to areas experiencing spikes in demand or shortages in supply. The b idirec tional 
capacity, promoted for most EU cross-border points with the EU Regulation on security of  gas supply, has 
contributed in this regard. There are a few areas where markets and physical interconnections need further 
development. For example, roughly 40%, of the EU’s LNG regasification capacity cannot be accessed by 
neighbouring states (IEA, 2018), and some countries in central and southeast Europe still have limited access 
to alternative sources of supply. 
However the debate on Europe’s gas transmission system is sh ifting from traditional concerns around 
ensuring security of gas supply to questions over the role of gas infrastructure in a decarbonising European 
energy system. As the European Union anticipates pathways to reach carbon neutrality in the Commission’s  
latest 2050 strategy, options to decarbonise the gas supply itself are gaining attention –with the use of low 
and neutral GHG gases. Natural gas infrastructure must evolve to fu lfi l additional functions beyond its 
traditional role of transporting fossil gas from the production site to the boiler. Europe’s gas infrastructure will 
need to adapt to the demands of sustainable development. 
2.1 The natural gas supply chain 
There are abundant natural gas sources in the world and, in comparison to oil, they are better geographically 
spread which makes natural gas far more attractive from a geopolitical point of view. In any case, natural gas 
needs to be transported from the source to the point of consumption. There are two common means of 
transport: pipelines and liquefied natural gas, both of them requiring large investments. The major build-up of 
LNG facilities throughout the world in recent years is due to the fact that gas transportation in pipelines is not 
practical in most cases of long sea distances (more than 800 km). Apart from pipelines and LNG te rminals 
there are other components that are key to the transport and operation of the gas system and that are part 
of the natural gas supply chain. 
The gas supply chain comprises several phases (see Figure 1) that allows bringing gas from the wells  to the 
burn pit of a boiler. The main steps of the natural gas supply chain are summarised in: 
Gas exploration and production. It includes drilling, extraction, and recovery of the fuel from underground, 
either onshore or subsea. 
Processing plant. Cleaning raw natural gas by separating impurities and the various hydrocarbons and f lu ids. 
Processing plants produce dry natural gas with an adequate pipeline quality that can be  used as fuel by 
residential, commercial, and industrial consumers. 
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Delivery to connected transmission pipelines or liquefaction. Liquefaction occurs at normal atmosphe ric  
pressure by super-cooling the natural gas to -160°C, creating liquefied natural gas for ease and safety non-
pressurized storage or transport. The reversed process occurs at regasification plants, where the temperature 
of LNG is increased, typically through seawater vaporizers, transforming it into gas prepared for use. 
Transmission, storage and bulk supply to large consumers directly connected to the transmission system and 
to distribution companies. 
Distribution, storage and retailing of gas to residential, commercial and industrial consumers. 
Figure 1. The gas supply chain 
 
Source : American Petroleum Institute (API). 
Due to the structure of the gas supply chain, natural gas transmission has traditionally been a monopolistic  
industry. Today it is regulated by specific EU legislation on Third Party Access (EC Regulation 715/2009) and 
open access to the infrastructure. Gas transmission system operators (TSOs) as well as operators of storage 
or LNG facilities are required to grant energy companies non-discriminatory access to their infrastructure . 
They must offer the same service to different users under identical contractual conditions. A number of other 
specific rules ensuring competition in natural gas apply to the sector and its pipeline systems,  such as the 
existence of independent regulators who ensure the application of the rules or the right to choose or change 
suppliers without extra charges. 
In the following sections the types and main characteristics of the most re levant components of the gas 
supply chain will be examined with a closer view to the facilities that comprise the European gas system. 
Underground storage facilities, LNG terminals, compressor stations and p ipelines are key e lements to 
transport and make use of natural gas in all demand points. The operation mode of these facilities and the 
manner in which they can fail are analysed with the aim of understanding better the technical factors that 
could compromise the security of gas supply. 
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3 Underground Storage Facilities 
The exploration, production, and transportation of natural gas takes time, and the natural gas that reaches its  
destination is not always needed right away, so it is injected into unique warehouses underground. 
Traditionally, natural gas has been a seasonal fuel. That is, demand for natural gas is usually h igher during 
the winter, partly because it is used for heating in residential and commercial settings. UGS faciliti es are 
developed to supply gas in times of peak demand, playing a vital role in ensuring that any excess supply 
delivered during the summer months is available to meet the increased demand of the winter months . 
However, in some Member States where natural gas is used for fired electric generation, demand for natural 
gas during the summer months can also increase (due to the demand for electricity to power air conditioners). 
Strategically, underground gas storage provides security of supply in case there are disruptions to production 
and transmission. 
As mentioned, natural gas storage is required for two reasons: meeting seasonal demand requirements , and 
as insurance against unforeseen supply disruptions. Now, in addition to serving those purposes,  natural ga s 
storage is also used by industry participants for commercial reasons; storing gas when prices are low,  and 
withdrawing and selling it when prices are high, for instance. 
Natural gas is usually stored underground, in large storage reservoirs. There are th ree main types of 
underground storage: depleted gas reservoirs, aquifers, and salt caverns. In addition to underground storage,  
however, natural gas can be stored as liquefied natural gas. LNG allows natural gas to be shipped and stored 
in liquid form, meaning it takes up much less space than gaseous natural gas. This sort of  storage will be 
analysed in Section 4, p. 16. 
3.1 Types and operation of UGS facilities 
Natural gas is most commonly stored underground under pressure in three types of facilitie s: dep le ted 
reservoirs in oil and/or natural gas fields, aquifers, and salt cavern formations (see Figure  2) . Each storage 
type has its own physical characteristics of porosity, permeability and retention capability. And each type has 
intrinsic costs of maintenance, deliverability rates and cycling capability. All these govern the appropriateness 
of one or other type for particular applications. 
Figure 2. Main types of natural gas UGS facilities 
 
Source : American Petroleum Institute (API). 
Specific characteristics of depleted reservoirs, aquifers, and salt caverns can be found below. But in general, it 
is common for any underground storage facility the reconditioned before injection, to create a sort of storage 
vessel underground. Natural gas is injected into the formation, building up pressure as more natural gas is  
added. In this sense, the underground formation becomes a sort of pressurized natural gas container. The 
higher the pressure in the storage facility, the more readily gas may be extracted. Once the pressure drops to  
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below that of the wellhead, there is no pressure differential left to push the natural gas out of the storage 
facility. This means that, in any underground storage facility, there is a certain amount of gas that may never 
be extracted. This is known as physically unrecoverable gas that it is permanently embedded in the formation. 
In addition to this physically unrecoverable gas, underground storage facilities co ntain  what is  known as 
“cushion gas”. This is the volume of gas that must remain in the storage facility to p rovide the re quired 
pressurization to extract the remaining gas. In the normal operation of the storage facility, this cushion gas 
remains underground; however a portion of it may be extracted using specialized compression equipment at 
the wellhead. 
3.1.1 Depleted Fields 
Gas storage in depleted oil or gas fields is the most widespread and generally the least expensive method of 
storing natural gas in large quantities. They are also the quickest to develop, operate and maintain. They are 
formations that have already been exhausted of most of their recoverable oil and natural gas. This leaves an 
underground formation, geologically capable of holding natural gas. In addition, using an already developed 
reservoir for storage purposes allows the use of the extraction and distribution equipment left ove r from 
when the field was productive. Having this extraction network in place  reduces the cost of conve rting a 
depleted reservoir into a storage facility. Depleted reservoirs are also attractive because their geological 
characteristics are already well known.  
The factors that determine whether or not a depleted reservoir will make a suitable storage facility are  both 
geographic and geologic. Geographically, depleted reservoirs must be relatively close to consuming regions . 
They must also be close to transportation infrastructure, including trunk pipelines and distribution systems. 
Geologically, depleted reservoir formations must have high permeability and porosity. The poros ity of the  
formation determines the amount of natural gas that it may hold, while its permeability determines the  rate  
at which natural gas flows through the formation, which in turn determines the rate of injection and 
withdrawal of working gas. In the majority of oil/gas fields, the gas is held in a porous rock which has spaces 
between the grains, forming an interconnecting, permeable network. The porosity and permeability enables 
the gas to move through the rock mass. Gas can be injected in to the reservoir rock to be stored in  the 
connected pore spaces. As gas is removed from the oil/gas field, the pressure in the reservoir depletes and 
water invasion occurs. 
Depleted fields are ideal UGS facilities to meet the increases of seasonal demand, known as base load 
storage capacity. Base load facilities are capable of holding enough natural gas to satisfy long term seasonal 
demand requirements. Typically, the operation rate for natural gas in these facilities is a year; natural gas is  
generally injected during the summer (non-heating season), which usually runs from April through October,  
and withdrawn during the winter (heating season), usually from November to March. These reservoirs are 
larger, but their delivery rates are relatively low, meaning the natural gas that can be extracted each day is 
limited. Instead, these facilities provide a prolonged, steady supply of natural gas. Depleted gas reservoirs are 
the most common type of base load storage facility. 
3.1.2 Aquifers 
Aquifers are underground porous, permeable rock formations that act as natural water reservoirs. However, in 
certain situations, these water containing formations may be reconditioned and used as natural gas storage  
facilities. An aquifer is suitable for natural gas storage if the water-bearing sedimentary rock formation is  
overlaid with an impermeable cap rock. Aquifers are based upon the same concepts as depleted oil/gas fields, 
but are a more costly option as they require conditioning and more preliminary work to prove their capability 
to hold and contain gas under pressure. Their use for natural gas storage usually requires more cushion gas 
and allows less flexibility in injecting and withdrawing. Aquifer storage is usually only used in areas where no 
nearby depleted hydrocarbon reservoirs exist. 
There are multiple reasons for which aquifers are the most expensive type of natural gas storage facility: 
 The geological characteristics of aquifer formations are not as thoroughly known as with depleted 
reservoirs. Discovering the geological characteristics of an aquifer, and determining its suitability as a 
natural gas storage facility is needed prior to development of the formation. On the same grounds 
seismic testing must be performed and the area of the formation, the capacity of the reservoir, the 
composition and porosity, and the existing formation pressure must all be investigated. 
 The associated infrastructure (installation of wells, extraction equipment, p ipelines , dehydration  
facilities, and possibly compression equipment) must be developed.  
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 Since aquifers are naturally full of water, in some cases powerful injection equipment must be used , 
to allow sufficient injection pressure to push down the resident water and replace it with natural gas. 
 Upon extraction from a water bearing aquifer formation the gas typically requires further 
dehydration prior to transportation, which requires specialized equipment near the wellhead. 
 Aquifer formations do not have the same natural gas retention capabilities as depleted reservoirs. 
This means that some of the natural gas that is injected escapes from the formation,  and must be 
gathered and extracted by “collector” wells, specifically designed to pick up gas that may escape 
from the primary aquifer formation. 
All of these factors mean that developing an aquifer formation as a storage facility can be time consuming 
and expensive. 
3.1.3 Salt Caverns 
Salt caverns are formed out of existing salt bed deposits. They can be abandoned salt mines (salt beds), with 
generally shallow depth (few hundreds of metres) and not originally constructed with gas storage in mind , o r 
solution mined caverns (salt domes), created by solution mining during the production of brine and chlorine 
products. The walls of a salt cavern also have the structural strength of steel, which makes it very resilient 
against reservoir degradation over the life of the storage facility. 
Once a suitable salt dome or salt bed deposit is discovered, and deemed suitable for natural gas storage, it is 
necessary to develop a “salt cavern” within the formation. Essentially, this consists of using water to dissolve 
and extract a certain amount of salt from the deposit, leaving a large empty space in the formation . Th is  is  
done by drilling a well down into the formation, and cycling large amounts of water through the  completed 
well. This water will dissolve some of the salt in the deposit, and be cycled back up the well, leaving a large 
empty space that the salt used to occupy. This process is known as “salt cavern leaching”. 
Salt cavern leaching is used to create caverns in both types of salt deposits,  and can be  quite expensive. 
However, once created, a salt cavern offers an underground natural gas storage vessel with ve ry high 
deliverability. In addition, cushion gas requirements are the lowest of all three storage types. 
These storage facilities, as they are open vessels, offer high deliverability and are ideal to meet the 
requirements as peak load facilities. These are intended to have high-deliverability for short periods of time. 
These facilities cannot hold as much natural gas as base load facilities; however, they can deliver smaller 
amounts of gas more quickly, and can also be refilled in a shorter amount of time than base load fac ilities. 
While base load facilities have long term injection and withdrawal seasons, turning over the natural gas in the 
facility about once per year, peak load facilities can have turnover rates as short as a few days or weeks. Salt 
caverns are the most common type of peak load storage facility, although aquif ers may be used to meet 
these demands as well. 
3.2 The components of a gas storage facility 
As it has been discussed in the previous section, there are different types of UGS facilities designed to  meet 
different requirements. However, the following components are usually common to any UGS facility intended 
to stock natural gas:  
Underground reservoir 
Underground reservoirs are geological structures in a porous medium with certain degree of permeability that 
allows natural gas to be contained. Overlying the porous medium there is an impermeable layer, usually 
curved or dome-shaped, that prevents the gas from rising to the surface. The  bottom part of  the porous 
medium may be sealed by impermeable rock or by water. 
Injection and withdrawal wells 
Wells are used to transfer gas into and out of the storage reservoir. The most common type of wells are  the  
combined injection-withdrawal which are used to either inject or withdraw gas. However, due to  particu lar 
reservoir characteristics, it may not be feasible or desirable to inject or withdraw in a particular portion of the 
reservoir. In those cases there may be separated wells used for injection and withdrawal. There are also the 
so called observation wells that are used to monitor water migration in the reservoir and d etermine if  gas 
could escape if it reached there. 
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Gathering system 
The gathering system connects the system of wells with the central point facilitie s. The most common 
arrangement is the tree configuration where wells are connected to pipes. Usually, a meter is installed at the 
wellhead to measure the flow rate of gas to and from an individual well. 
Compressor facility 
The compressor facility is usually located at some central point near the wells and may be used to compress 
the gas for injection, for withdrawal or both. The compressors are generally used for injec tion because the 
reservoir operating pressure is usually higher than the transmission system pressures. Since the compressors 
are available, they are often used for withdrawal also in order to increase deliverability. There are cases 
where a shallow, low pressure field is used for gas storage and the injection is done at pipeline pressure and 
compressors are used to withdraw the gas. 
Central point metering facility 
Accurate metering at the central point is essential for good inventory control. Due to  the widely d ifferent 
characteristics of the injection and withdrawal flow streams, it is often impractical to measure both streams 
with a single meter facility. 
Central Point Separators 
These should be used for both the injection and withdrawal streams. The injection separator prevents any 
dust and particle matter (also liquids) brought in from the pipeline from contaminating and clogging the wells. 
The withdrawal separators keeps any sand from the reservoir from entering the pipeline. Both separators 
protect the compressors. 
Dehydrator 
A storage reservoir almost always contains some water and may have an active water drive. When dry gas 
from the pipeline is injected into the storage reservoir, liquid water from the formation will evaporate into the 
injected gas. The gas will then have too much water to be pipeline quality gas. The gas must be dehydrated 
on the withdrawal cycle. Commonly, the dehydrators in storage facilities are glycol units. 
Transmission line to the pipeline 
The transmission line connects the UGS facility central point to the pipeline system. 
3.3 Characteristics of the underground storage 
There are several features that are used to quantify the fundamental characteristics of an underground 
storage facility: 
 Total gas storage capacity: this is the maximum volume of natural gas that can be  stored in  an 
underground storage facility in accordance with its design. 
 Total gas in storage: it is the volume of natural gas in the underground facility at a particular time. 
 Cushion gas: it is the volume of natural gas intended as permanent inventory in a storage reservoir 
to maintain adequate pressure and deliverability rates throughout the withdrawal season. 
 Working gas capacity: it refers to total gas storage capacity minus cushion gas. 
 Working gas: it is the volume of gas in the reservoir above the level of cushion gas. Working gas is 
the volume of gas in the storage reservoir that can be extracted during the normal operation of the 
storage facility and that it is available to the market. This is the natural gas that is being stored and 
withdrawn; the capacity of storage facilities normally refers to their working gas capacity. At the  
beginning of a withdrawal cycle, the pressure inside the storage facility is at its  h ighest; meaning 
working gas can be withdrawn at a high rate. As the volume of gas inside the storage facility drops, 
pressure (and thus deliverability) in the storage facility also decreases. 
 Deliverability or withdrawal capacity: it is a measure of the amount of gas that can be delivered 
(withdrawn) from a storage facility on a daily basis. It is usually expressed in terms of million cubic  
meters per day (Mcm/d), although energy units are also common (GWh/d). The deliverability of a 
given storage facility is variable, and it depends on factors such as the amount of natural gas in  the 
reservoir at any particular time, the pressure within the reservoir, the compression capability 
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available to the reservoir, the configuration and capabilities of surface facilities associated with the 
reservoir, and other factors. In general, a facility's deliverability rate varies direc tly with the total 
amount of natural gas in the reservoir: it is at its highest when the reservoir is most full and declines 
as working gas is withdrawn. 
 Injection capacity (or rate): it is the complement of the deliverability or withdrawal capacity. Th is is  
the amount of natural gas that can be injected into a storage fac ility on a daily basis . As with 
deliverability, injection capacity is usually expressed in Mcm/d, although GWh/day is a lso  used. The  
injection capacity of a storage facility is also variable, and it is dependent on factors comparable  to 
those that determine deliverability. By contrast, the injection rate varies inverse ly with the total 
amount of gas in storage: it is at its lowest when the reservoir is most full and increases as working 
gas is withdrawn. 
None of these measures for any given storage facility are fixed or absolute. The rates of injec tion and 
withdrawal change as the level of natural gas varies within the facility. In practice, a storage facility may be  
able to exceed certificated total capacity in some circumstances by exceeding certain operational parameters. 
The facility's total capacity can also vary, temporarily or permanently,  as its  de fining paramete rs vary. 
Measures of cushion gas, working gas, and working gas capacity can also change from time to time. Finally, 
storage facilities can withdraw cushion gas for supply to market during times of particularly heavy demand,  
although by definition, this gas is not intended for that use. 
3.4 The European UGS facilities 
The storage gas sector in Europe has grown fast since 2006 pushed by the need to address the decrease of 
European gas production, the increasing consumption and flexibility requirements , and the opportunity to 
exploit price volatility of the new liberalised markets (European Commission, 2015). Gas storage can p lay an 
important role in providing flexibility and security of gas supplies. Depending on their design and 
characteristics, UGS can secure supplies in times of high demand and h igh prices by provid ing seasonal 
flexibility and cheaper gas. It can also facilitate the proper functioning of the gas market by provid ing short 
term flexibility. In the future, as shares of renewables in the electricity generation mix increase the role of gas 
as flexible back-up fuel in promoting the security of gas supply may be further enhanced with the he lp of 
flexible storage facilities. 
In this section an overview of the UGS facilities in the EU is provided. The full list and main characteristics  of  
the EU UGS facilities are compiled in Table A1 of Annex 1. There are 19 European Member States that hold 
underground storage capacity. From Figure 3 it is possible to infer that the total storage capacity of UGS 
facilities in the European Union is currently 1277 TWh and that the largest capacities belong to Germ any,  
Italy, Austria and France, with around 50% of total capacity concentrated in Germany, Italy and France. The 
same three countries have the highest concentration of storage sites, and together account for 57% of the 
total number of underground storage facilities in Europe (see Table A1 of Annex 1). 
Figure 4 shows the ratio between the working capacity of underground gas storage facilities and the gas 
consumption in European countries. The undoubted leader in this case is Austria, which can store almost all its 
annual consumption. A significant part of the annual consumption can also be stored in Hungary and Slovakia. 
In the opposite site they are found Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, UK and Portugal, which ration working 
capacity/consumption is close to zero. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the volume of working gas in EU UGS facilities by country 
 
Source : JRC figure based on data from Gas Storage Europe, 2018. 
Figure 4. Working capacity/consumption ratio in Europe . 
 
 
Source : Gas Storage Europe data, Eurostat data (Stopa, J., 2018). 
Underground storage sites can be categorised in three main types: salt caverns, depleted fields and aquifers . 
Salt caverns are the most common UGS facilities in EU, followed by depleted fields (see Figure 5) . As it was 
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explained in section 3.1, salt caverns have the highest injection and withdrawal rates, and these are 
concentrated in Germany, France, UK, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal. 
Figure 5. Breakdown of operational UGS facilities in Europe by type  
 
Source : JRC figure based on data from Gas Storage Europe, 2018. 
3.5 Main Failure Modes 
Underground storage is the safest way to store large quantities of hydrocarbons. Deep formations are almost 
perfectly impermeable and underground, hydrocarbons are separated from the oxygen in the a ir by several 
hundred meters of rock. This same natural barrier protects them from fire, wilful damage and aircraft impact. 
The fact that gas is stored underground at high pressure does not p resent any problem insofar as h igh 
pressure is the natural state of the fluids underground. However, hydrocarbons are valuable because they 
release large quantities of energy when they burn or explode, making them hazardous to transport or store. 
A thorough review of incidents relating to UGS has been carried out by British Geological Survey (Evans , 
2007). The report encounters overall 64 examples of problems at UGS facilities (82% of them have occurred 
in America). Of these, 27 have been at salt cavern facilities, 16 at aquifers and 16 at depleted oil/gas f ields . 
The 64 incidents have been of varying cause, severity and nature, with some involving only minor p roblems 
that were quickly rectified and at not stage threatened failure of the facility or release of product. However, in 
four of these incidents a total of 8 deaths have been found reported in the literature as a result of the release 
of the stored product, all involving storage in salt cavern facilities. Incidents have been categorised according 
to their cause. 
Incidents resulting from failure of the storage cavity in depleted oil/gas fields are a type of failure considered 
as a geological failure and involve the migration of the gas out of the original cavity through either rock mass 
discontinuities or faults. The majority of the documented problems in depleted oil and gas fields have been 
reported in the USA, specifically in California, which it has particu lar geological factors that would not 
necessarily be applicable or relevant to assessment of UGS in the Europe situation. 
Incidents resulting from failure of the storage cavity in salt caverns involve the migration of gas away from 
the original storage area or no release of gas at all. However, the consequence in both cases implies that the 
capacity of the cavity changes and there is the potential for an inc ident to  occur if the p roblem is  not 
detected, for instance overfilling if the reduced capacity is not identified. 
Incidents resulting from well failure involve releases through failed or leaky boreholes, casing failure and well 
valve failure. Usually this failure leads to failure of the pipework connecting the storage cavity to the surface. 
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Table 1. Summary of overall incidents in UGS reported by type of facility. 
Cause Depleted oil/gas incidents 
Salt cavern 
incidents 
Aquifer incidents Others 
Failure of the storage 
cavity 
6 7   
Well failures 5 11   
Above ground 
infrastructure 
3 7   
Unknown 2 2 16 5 
TOTAL number of 
incidents 
16 27 16 5 
Source : British Geological Survey report (Evans, 2007). 
Although many of the incidents have occurred in the US and very few failures have been reported in Europe, a 
working group was set up in 1998 by Marcogaz1 to exchange information on European UGS operations. E ight 
European companies participated and an accident database was established. The eight companies taking part 
in the study owned 42 sites in total which corresponds to 845 wells. The study concluded that: 
 6 accidents occurred due to surface processes over a cumulative  period of 970 years and the 
calculated probability for major accidents on surface facilities of UGS sites was 6x10 -3 
accident/year/site.  
 5 accidents occurred due to faulty wells over a cumulative period of 100 155 years and the 
calculated probability for major accidents on wells of UGS sites was 5x10-5 accident/year/site. 
 1 accident occurred that resulted in severe injury due to well problems over a cumulative period of 
100 155 years and the calculated probability of major accidents resulting in severe injury on wells  
was 1x10-5 accident/year/site. 
From the Marcogaz study, HSE (HSE, 2008) used different methodologies to estimate operating experience for 
different UGS types in order to estimate failure rates according not only to the cause of the failure but also to 
its type. The different types of failure of the UGS system were calculated using the incidents described in 
Table 1 and the operating experience estimated in the HSE report (HSE 2008). Calculated fa ilure rates are  
compiled in Table 2 according to facility types and failure causes. The HSE report states that these failure 
rates are likely to be pessimistic since they try to extrapolate accident data from the US,  where  higher 
numbers of incidents associated to geological factors are not necessari ly applicable or relevant to  the 
situation in Europe. 
Table 2. Summary of calculated failure rates by type of facility and failure scenario . 
Failure Rate 
Depleted  
oil/gas fields 
(Europe) 
Salt caverns 
(Europe) 
Depleted  
oil/gas fields 
(worldwide) 
Salt caverns 
(worldwide) 
Failure of the storage 
cavity (per well year) 
1.2 x 10-5 4.1 x 10-5 9.9 x 10-6 3.4 x 10-5 
Well failures (per well 
year) 
1.2 x 10-5 4.1 x 10-5 8.3 x 10-6 1.7 x 10-4 
Source : Failure rates for underground gas storage, (HSE report, 2008). 
                                     
1 Technical Association of the European Natural Gas Industry 
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4 LNG terminals 
4.1 Types of LNG terminals 
One of the main steps in the LNG process chain involves the import terminals. These are marine or waterfront 
facilities where the LNG is delivered by sea vessels, regasified and sometimes stored before being in jected 
into the distribution system. LNG regasification terminal layouts can be c lassif ied unde r four categories 
(iNTeg-Risk project 2011a): 
 On-shore 
 Off-shore gravity based structure (GBS) 
 Off-shore floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) 
 Off-shore transport and regasification vessel (TRV) 
The most common and developed layout type is currently the on-shore LNG facility. This layout consists of a 
plant build nearby the sea, usually within a harbour area. It typically consists of a docking area, provided with 
a jetty and loading/unloading arms and a standard boil-off gas (BOG) handling and recovery section. Th is  
concept of regasification terminal has been developed decades ago. Some of the facilities in  th is  category 
have been built as early as the 60s (for instance, the Panigaglia terminal in Italy was built in 1967).  
From a structural point of view, offshore LNG terminals can be fixed (e.g. sea island jetty or jacket) or floating 
(e.g. floating wharf and weather vanning). The selected support technology is c rucial s ince it has a large 
impact on investment and operating costs, flexibility, safety, availability and reliability, time for completion , 
etc. While offshore LNG regasification systems may appear to offer many advantages over onshore systems, 
they also introduce new challenges, risks, and uncertainties into the LNG supply chain. Whereas offshore o il 
platforms have a long track record, the concept of offshore LNG regasification is quite new and thus has new 
considerations in terms of environmental issues, floating operations and floating LNG offloading . There are 
many considerations for siting offshore LNG regasification terminals, including shallow water or deep-wate r 
locations, coastal or deep offshore locations. Final designs depend on distance from shore, marine 
environment, type of soil, pipeline availability, and market area (Bulte 2017). 
An innovative layout for LNG regasification purposes is the off-shore gravity based structure (GBS) 
regasification terminal. The design is typically developed around a large concrete structure, which houses 
modular self-supporting storage tanks, specifically designed for this layout type. Offshore concrete structures 
for the production of oil and gas are well established and proven in the North Sea and other areas,  with 
developments started more than 40 years ago. Such structures have demonstrated excellent performance in  
a hostile marine environment with an absolute minimum of maintenance (Haug, Eie et al. 2003). In 2009 the 
offshore terminal of Porto Viro, in Porto Levante near Rovigo in Italy, was the first LNG regasification facility 
of this type in the world to be inaugurated.  
A floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) is a solution consisting of a vessel, new or reconverted 
from a carrier, equipped with tanks for LNG storage and with all the required vaporization process equipment 
(Bulte 2017). The FRSU’s main components are: LNG transfer system (offloading system); Storage tanks, ( in  
ship); Boil-off gas handling system; LNG pumping system; Vaporization equipment; Delivery fac ility;  and 
Auxiliary systems. In the FSRU, the LNG delivered by LNG carriers is received by the FSRU offloading system, 
stored in tanks, pumped, regasified into natural gas and delivered to consumers through a f lexib le or rig id 
riser, connected to the subsea pipeline or via high-pressure loading arms fixed on a jetty. Prior to its delivery, 
the natural gas flow rate is measured and the gas is odorized. (Songhurst 2017) outlines the development of 
this type of structure over the past 16 years, describing the physical processes involved , the capita l and 
operating cost parameters and the key benefits of using an FSRU vessel. This author also describes the main  
players in the industry, the contractual models that have been developed and reports a full listing of a ll the 
current vessels in operation, as well as those under construction, thus providing a comprehensive overview of 
the state of the market as of mid-2017.  
Off-shore TRV regasification terminals are similar to the FSRU typology in many features. They make us of 
an LNG carrier (and are hence not affected by sea depth) but are not permanently moored to the seabed, thus 
maintaining their own capability to transport LNG). 
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4.2 Operation of LNG terminals 
A typical on-shore LNG import terminal process flow diagram is shown in Figure 6, whereas Figure 7 depicts  
the flow diagram for a FSRU. The major equipment components of an LNG import and regasification terminal 
are:  
 Unloading arms; 
 Cryogenic pipelines; 
 Storage tank(s); 
 Low pressure pumps; 
 Boil-Off Gas (BOG) compressors and re-condensers; 
 High pressure (HP) pumps; 
 Vaporisers. 
Figure 6. Example of an onshore LNG import terminal flow scheme. 
 
Source : International Group of Liquified Natural Gas Importers, 2014. 
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Figure 7. Example of a FSRU flow scheme 
 
Source : Khan, 2018. 
LNG unloading operations use articulated arms which are specifically designed to transfer cargo safely from 
the ship’s manifold system to the terminal. Once the LNG carrier is moored, loading arms are gradually chilled 
to -162°C (-259°F) prior to the beginning of LNG unloading operations. The unloading arms are able to endure 
the expansion and contraction resulting from changes in temperature. A risk during unloading is the potential 
extension and rupture of unloading arms due to ship movements. Consequently, these arms are equipped with 
emergency disconnect systems. To protect both the ship’s manifold connection and the te rminal’s arms, a 
Power Emergency Release Coupler is typically fitted into most arm installations. This system, comprised of 
two ball valves and an emergency release coupler, allows the rapid disconnection of the LNG carrier from the 
terminal while limiting the amount of LNG released. Position detectors check that the ship is not shifting too 
quickly in a manner likely to damage the connecting arms. These detectors can activate the emergency 
disconnection system. If the vessel moves outside the normal operating range for the connecting arms,  an 
emergency shutdown device is automatically activated and LNG transfer is halted. Further movement of the 
vessel outside of the operating range will activate the emergency release system. The ball valves will c lose 
and the emergency release coupler will operate. One ball valve remains attached to the ship and the other 
stays attached to the hard arm. The release system may also be manually activated by an operator. 
After unloading, LNG is transferred via cryogenic pipelines to insulated storage tanks specifically built to ho ld 
LNG. LNG storage tanks are designed to withstand cryogenic temperatures, maintain the liquid at low 
temperature, and minimize the amount of LNG escaping. The small part of LNG that evaporates is called boil-
off gas (BOG). Boil-off gas is the vapour produced above the surface of a boiling cargo due to  evaporation,  
typically caused by heat or a pressure drop. The temperature within the  tank will remain constant if the 
pressure is kept constant by allowing the boil-off gas to escape from the tank. This gas is  captured and is 
either re-condensed or re-injected into the LNG carrier to maintain positive pressure during the unloading of 
the ship. In abnormal or accidental situations, the BOG can be sent to the flare to be safely dispersed.  
The storage facility is designed with a venting feature as an ultimate protection against risk of overpressure  
due to a “roll-over” condition in the LNG tank. LNG “rollover” refers to the rapid release of LNG vapours from a 
storage tank, resulting from stratification. The potential for rollover arises when two stratif ied laye rs of 
different densities (due to different LNG compositions) exist in a tank. To prevent rollover, special instruments 
(densitometers) are used to monitor the development of the layers within the tank,  thereby allowing the 
operator to mix the LNG (either within the tank or with LNG from a different tank) to di ssolve the 
stratification. An import terminal usually has two or more LNG storage tanks. The types of tank types are as 
follows: 
 Single containment tanks; 
 Double containment tanks; 
 Full containment tanks; 
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 Membrane tanks; 
 In-ground tanks. 
The LNG stored in the tanks is eventually sent to vaporisers, which warm and regasify the liquefied gas. The  
main types of vaporisers used in the LNG industry are: 
 Open Rack Vaporisers; 
 Submerged Combustion Vaporisers; 
 Intermediate Fluid Vaporisers; 
 Ambient Air Vaporisers. 
Open Rack Vaporisers derive the heat necessary to vaporise LNG from seawater. The water is first filtered to  
avoid the presence of small solid particles in the ORV. It then falls onto panels of tubes containing LNG and 
then gathers in a trough underneath before being discharged back into the sea. The LNG passing through the  
tubes is heated and vaporises. The tubes are specifically designed to optimise heat exchange.  Submerged 
Combustion Vaporisers burn natural gas produced by the terminal and pass the hot gases into a water bath 
containing a tubular heat exchanger where LNG flows. The froth produced by the combustion gas increases 
the efficiency of heat transfer between the water and the LNG, and prevents ice from forming on the  tube 
bundle. This type of vaporisers typically uses 1.2 to 1.5 % of the natural gas processed. In te rmediate Flu id  
Vaporisers rely upon two levels of thermal exchange: the first is between LNG and an intermediate fluid such 
as propane, and the second is between the intermediate fluid and a heat source,  usually seawater. The 
surface area of the exchangers is designed to optimise the heat exchange. In te rmediate  flu id vaporise rs 
prevent freeze-up and reduce fouling risks. This particular operational benefit can justify the inc reased cost 
that arises from the use of an intermediate fluid. Ambient Air Vaporisers use the heat from the a ir. It is  a 
proven technology and has generally been used for smaller installations such as LNG satellite terminals fed 
with LNG by road truck. The units may have natural convection of fan-assisted airf low. Some larger units 
have recently been installed at LNG import terminals where seawater systems are considered unsuitable. 
Before natural gas is distributed to consumers, a slightly unpleasant-smelling odour is  added . A typ ical 
odorant is THT (tetrahydrothiophene) or mercaptan. Because natural gas is colourless and odourless, a leak is  
impossible to detect without appropriate instruments. To make the detection of a gas leak easier, whether it is 
in our kitchen or in a pipeline, an odorant is normally added to natural gas. The odorisation station  can be in 
the LNG terminal itself before the send-out of natural gas, or just a few kilometres beyond the terminal. The 
point at which odorants are added depends on the country. Many terminals that export to  a h igh -pressure 
transmission line do not odorise. Metering, the last step at the terminal, measures the quantity of gas which is 
being sent out. Natural gas is then delivered by pipeline directly to customers for industrial or residential use. 
In conclusion, Figure 8 reports the typical schematic of the LNG regasification process. 
1) At the terminal, LNG is offloaded from the carrier and is transferred to storage tanks. 
2) In some configurations (e.g. TRV terminals) there is no LNG storage and LNG is  vaporized on - 
board and offloaded as compressed natural gas by a sea line. In the other cases, LNG is 
transferred via the unloading arms from the moored carrier to the LNG storage tanks by 
cryogenic pipelines.  
3) The pressure in the LNG storages of the carrier during unloading operations is  maintained 
constant by a back flow of NG vapour from the storage tanks to the carrier. 
4) In the vaporization stage, LNG is compressed to the desired final delivery pressure and vaporized 
by dedicated heat exchangers (vaporizers). Alternative configurations use different heat sources 
(hot combustion gases, seawater, ambient air, waste heat, etc.) and different heating media 
(propane, water, water/glycol mixtures, air, etc.). 
5) In the correction and measurement sections of the process, the quality of the gas is brought to  
the specification of the national grid. The correction  usually consists  in in troducing dosed 
quantities of air or nitrogen-enriched air in the natural gas. 
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Figure 8. Scheme of the LNG regasification process 
 
 
Source : Vianello and Maschio, 2014. 
4.3 An overview of LNG regasification terminals in EU 
The following account is largely based on the thorough report by (King & Spalding 2018) and by information 
reported by Gas Infrastructure Europe, see for instance (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019a) and (Gas 
Infrastructure Europe 2019b). Annex 2 reports tables that summarise the most essential information for large 
and small LNG terminals, including operational as well as planned facilities. Table 3 below summarises the 
annual regasification capacity of LNG large scale import terminal of EU countries. 
 
Table 3. Annual regasification capacity of LNG large scale import terminal per country (bcm/year) . 
COUNTRY Operational Under construction Suspended Planned 
Belgium 9 
   
Croatia 
 
3 
  
Cyprus 
   
2 
Estonia  
   
7 
France 34 
  
11 
Germany 
   
26 
Greece 7 
  
6 
Ireland 
   
14 
Italy 15 
  
8 
Latvia 
   
5 
Lithuania 4 
   
Malta 1 
   
Netherlands 12 
  
4 
Poland 5 3 
 
8 
Portugal 8 
   
Spain 69 3 
 
4 
United Kingdom 48 
 
4 13 
EU 28 212 9 4 108 
Source : (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019b). 
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4.3.1 Belgium  
Belgium is a major hub for gas supply in Europe, with some 80 bcm transiting the country each year,  
compared with domestic consumption of just over 17 bcm/year. It has a robust transport network that is well 
integrated with other countries through 18 entry points. Belgium does not produce any natural gas and relies 
entirely on imports to supply its gas needs. In 2017 Belgium imported 1.11 bcm of LNG (net of re-exports)  – 
an increase of 11.7% from 2016 – and was Europe’s ninth largest importer of LNG. Gas imports into Belgium 
are fairly diversified by origin and type of supply: the Netherlands and Norway are the p rincipal pipe l ine 
suppliers, each providing about a third of total gas imports. The Zeepipe, which brings piped gas from Norway, 
and the Interconnector gas pipeline between Belgium and the UK, both land at Zeebrugge. LNG is  imported 
into Belgium through a single LNG terminal, Zeebrugge.  
Zeebrugge Terminal. The Zeebrugge LNG terminal is located along the northern part of the Belgian coastline 
and is built on a man-made island. It is owned and operated by Fluxys LNG SA. The terminal came  into 
operation in 1987, initially having a single jetty, three storage tanks and send-out facilities . Be tween 2004 
and 2007 the terminal was expanded to include a fourth storage tank and increased send -out capacity. 
Testing and commissioning of a second jetty were completed at Zeebrugge at the end of 2016. LNG unloaded 
at the terminal can be regasified to be traded or consumed as natural gas within Belgium, or supplied to other 
end consumer markets in any direction (the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, France and Southern 
Europe), or traded on the Zeebrugge hub. The Zeebrugge LNG terminal is increasingly active in  small -scale 
LNG. LNG loading services started at the terminal in 2008 and LNG truck loading in 2010. Since January 
2015, smaller ships have been loaded to supply remote industrial end users and to supply LNG as a fuel for 
ships and trucks. At present, the majority of LNG used as a fuel for shipping and road haulage in northwestern 
Europe is loaded at Zeebrugge.  
4.3.2 Croatia 
Krk LNG Terminal. The floating LNG terminal is located in Omišalj municipality on the is land of Krk,  in the 
Republic of Croatia It is a 2.6 billion cubic metres per year (bcm/y) floating LNG regasif ication  and import 
terminal project near completion. The terminal was developed and will be operated by LNG Croa tia,  a jo int 
venture of two Croatian state-owned companies. Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, the state-owned gas and electricity 
utility, holds 85% interest in LNG Croatia, while the remaining 15% is held by Croatia ’s  gas transmission 
system operator Plinacro. The final investment decision on the €233.6 million project was reached in January 
2019, while construction works were started in April 2019. The terminal will start ope rations in 1 January 
2021 and all free terminal capacity has already been booked for the next 3 years (2021-2023). 
4.3.3 France 
France produces about 1% of the gas it consumes, and almost all gas consumed in France is  imported. In  
2017, France imported 9.3 bcm of LNG and was Europe’s third largest importer of  LNG after Spain  and 
Turkey). France’s total natural gas imports are relatively well diversif ied, with significant imports from 
Norway, the Netherlands, Russia and Algeria. About 72% of the entry capacity to the French gas network is  
for cross-border gas pipelines, and the remaining entry capacity (about 28%) is for gas from France’s four 
existing LNG import terminals. Algeria is the main source of supply of LNG to France. France has four 
operational large-scale onshore LNG import terminals: Fos Cavaou and Fos Tonkin near Marseille, Montoir-de-
Bretagne on the Atlantic coast, and Dunkerque in north-west France. 
Fos Cavaou Terminal. The Fos Cavaou LNG terminal opened in 2010 and is located on France’s south coast 
along the main LNG transport routes, where it can easily receive gas from countries such as Egypt,  Algeria 
and the Middle East. Its regasification capacity of 8.25 bcm/year is equivalent to about one-sixth of France’s 
annual gas consumption. 90% of the terminal’s capacity is subscribed for on a long-term basis,  and the 
remaining 10% of capacity is available for subscription on the basis of short-term contracts. The  terminal 
offers truck loading services and plans to increase the load to up to 20 trucks by 2019. The terminal will offer 
LNG bunkering from 2019. The Fos Cavaou terminal has offered reloading services since 2012. It has also 
offered a transshipment service since December 2015.  
Fos Tonkin Terminal. The Fos Tonkin terminal, located 50 km west of Marseille, started operations in 1972,  
and was one of the first LNG terminals in Europe. The terminal has send-out capacity of 3.4 bcm/year – which 
has been reduced to 3 bcm/year since April 2015. Since June 2015 the Fos Tonkin terminal has offered LNG 
truck loading services for up to 4 trucks a day, increased to 8 trucks per day from July 2016 and 11 trucks 
per day from 2017.  
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Montoir-De-Bretagne Terminal. The Montoir-de-Bretagne LNG terminal is located on France’s Atlantic coast 
and was commissioned in 1980. Until 2005 it was the largest import terminal in Europe with a regasification 
capacity of 10 bcm/year. It has a storage capacity of 360,000 m3 and handles around 100 tanker shipments 
a year. Since 2013 the terminal has been active in ship-to-ship transfers. The terminal has provided LNG truck 
loading services, and since September 2017 the terminal has been able to load 18 LNG trucks each day. Like 
Fos Tonkin, the Montoir-de-Bretagne terminal is considering the introduction of ra i l loading services as a 
railway is available.  
Dunkerque Terminal. The Dunkerque LNG terminal came into commercial operation at the end of September 
2016. The terminal has a jetty large enough to enable the unloading/reloading of the largest LNG carriers and 
three storage tanks, each capable of storing 190,000 m3 of LNG. The terminal is connected to  both the 
French and Belgian gas distribution networks, and is capable of meeting about 20% of the two countries ’ 
annual gas demand. This link between Dunkerque and the Zeebrugge area contributes to the diversification of 
supply sources in North West Europe. The terminal offers regasification, reloading, loading of bunkering ships 
and truck loading services.  
4.3.4 Greece 
Greece produces only a small amount of gas, and demand for natural gas is steadily increasing . In  2017 
Greece imported 1.62 bcm of LNG and was Europe’s seventh largest importer of LNG. Be tween 2014 and 
2017 there was a 68% increase in gas consumption in Greece, with a 21% increase in 2017 compared with 
2016. Natural gas accounts for approximately 14% of Greece’s to tal p rimary energy supply,  of  which 
approximately one-quarter is LNG which is imported into Greece’s only LNG terminal at Revithoussa. The 
remaining part is imported from Russia by pipeline.  
Revithoussa Terminal. The Revithoussa LNG terminal is located on the islet of Revithoussa, west of Athens. It 
came into operation in 2000 and today has a capacity of 7 bcm/year. The combined storage capacity of its  
two LNG tanks is 130,000 m3. The second expansion project at Revithoussa – the construction of a third tank 
of 95,000 m3, and facilities for reloading small and medium-sized ships – commenced in May 2014 and was 
expected to be completed in 2017; however, the expansion project is ongoing. The terminal currently offers 
regasification and truck loading services. Reloading services are being considered, with a target date of end 
2018, and loading of bunkering ships is also under consideration for vessels as small as 1,000 m3.  
4.3.5 Italy  
Although Italy produces significant volumes of indigenous gas, it is one of Europe’s largest gas consumers at 
around 78 bcm/year and imports about 90% of the gas it consumes. In 2017 Italy imported 7.55 bcm of LNG 
and was Europe’s fourth largest importer of LNG. 60% of Italy’s imported natural gas is made up by just two 
countries: Algeria and Russia. Significant sources of imports are also  Libya, Qatar,  the Nethe rlands and 
Norway. Most of the country’s gas is imported by pipeline. LNG, which is imported into Italy’s three existing 
operational LNG import terminals at La Spezia (Panigaglia), Porto Levante and Toscana (offshore), until 2014 
accounted for only around 11% of the total volume of gas imported into the country. In 2015, however, LNG 
imports to Italy increased by almost 32% to around 4.3 bcm, largely due to supply from Qatar to the Adriatic 
LNG terminal (at Porto Levante). 2017 saw a further increase of 32% of LNG imports to Italy,  representing 
15% of the EU’s total LNG imports that year. Italy is planning three additional LNG import terminals : the 
Falconara Marittima (an FSRU), and two large-scale onshore terminals – Porto Empedocle in Sicily and Gioia 
Tauro LNG in Calabria.  
Panigaglia Terminal. The Panigaglia LNG import terminal, located in the municipality of Porto Venere in  the 
western part of the Gulf of La Spezia, started operations in 1971 and is one of the o ldest LNG import 
terminals in Europe. It currently has a capacity of 3.4 bcm/year, although an expansion is p lanned which 
includes increasing the terminal’s send-out capacity to 8 bcm/year, storage capac ity to  240,000 m3, the 
capability to unload ships of up to 140,000 m3, an update to the terminal’s storage tanks and equipment, and 
installation of a 32 MW cogeneration plant for the production of gas-fired electricity.  
Isola Di Porto Levante LNG Terminal. The Isola di Porto Levante (Rovigo) LNG terminal (also known as “Adriatic 
LNG”) is located in the northern Adriatic, 14 km offshore of Porto Viro, in Porto  Levante, near Rovigo. The 
terminal received its first cargo of LNG in August 2009 and was officially inaugurated in October 2009. The 
Porto Levante terminal is the first ever offshore Gravity Based structure (GBS) for the unloading, storage and 
regasification of LNG. The terminal has a regasification capacity of 8 bcm/year, which accounts for 
approximately 10% of Italy’s natural gas requirements.  
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FSRU OLT Offshore LNG Toscana. The OLT Offshore LNG Toscana project converted the Go lar Frost LNG 
carrier into a floating storage and regasification unit, which is permanently anchored about 22 km off  the 
Italian coast between Livorno and Pisa. The terminal became fully operational on 20 December 2013. The  
Toscana LNG terminal’s regasification capacity is 3.75 bcm/year, which is around 4% of  Italy’s gas 
requirements. Its storage capacity is 135,000 m3. 
4.3.6 Lithuania  
Lithuania has no domestic gas production, and has historically relied on Russia for 100% of its gas supply. In  
2017 Lithuania imported 1.10 bcm of LNG and was Europe’s tenth largest importer of  LNG. In  December 
2014 the first commercial cargo of LNG was delivered at Lithuania’s first LNG import terminal (FSRU Klaipeda 
LNG) marking the start of the country’s diversification of gas supply. In its first full operational year (2015) 
the Klaipeda LNG terminal operated primarily as a political tool to ensure security of supply to countries that 
traditionally have relied on imported gas from Russia, and imported only 0.32 bcm of LNG. In 2016, however,  
the terminal established its commercial viability. In the first three quarte rs of 2016 imports inc reased 
significantly, with an average utilisation rate of 40% compared with 14% in 2015. Howeve r, in  2017 LNG 
imports declined to 0.85 bcm of LNG, a 13.4% drop compared with 2016.  
Klaipeda LNG FSRU Terminal. The Klaipeda LNG FSRU is situated in the port of Klaipeda, Lithuania. The new -
build FSRU vessel “Independence” was developed by Hyundai Heavy Industries . It is  294 metres long,  46 
metres wide and 47 metres high. It has four storage tanks with a total capacity of 170,000 m3,  and has a 
send-out capacity of 4 bcm/year. The terminal now offers LNG bunkering services through new small-scale 
LNG facilities. From 2018 the terminal’s operator, Klaipedos Nafta, expects small-scale capacity holders using 
the terminal to bolster utilisation rates. The terminal has amended its regasification and capacity rights to  
accommodate small-scale users.  
4.3.7 Malta  
Malta has no domestic production of oil or gas and no gas distribution network. In  2017 Malta become 
Europe’s latest importer of LNG. In its first year Malta imported 0.32 bcm. Recently, Malta has been 
dependent on heavy oil as its main source of energy production but in 2013, an initiative was launched to  
introduce LNG supply to Malta for power generation. The project, which was completed in 2017, comprises an 
FSU, the Armada LNG Mediterrana; onshore regasification facilities; and the construction of a combined cyc le 
gas turbine plant, Delimara 4, alongside the existing Delimara 3. At the beginning of 2017, Malta received its 
first ever shipment of LNG at the Delimara terminal.  
Delimara LNG Terminal. The Delimara LNG terminal is located in Marsaxlokk, in the south-eastern  reg ion of 
Malta. It consists of an FSU and an onshore regasification facility. Its main purpose is  to supply regasif ied 
natural gas to both the Delimara 4 CCGT (215 MW) and the Delimara 3 (149 MW) power p lants , v ia a 
connecting gas pipeline. The Delimara FSU, Armada LNG Mediterrana, was originally built in 1985 and has a 
capacity of 125,000 m3 The FSU was converted from the former LNG carrier Wakabu Mar and is permanently 
moored by jetty near the Delimara Power Station.  
4.3.8 The Netherlands  
The Netherlands is the biggest producer of gas in the EU, but domestic supply is  decreasing . In  2017 the 
Netherlands imported 0.98 bcm of LNG and was Europe’s eleventh largest importer of LNG. The Gron ingen 
gas field in the north-eastern part of the Netherlands is the largest natural gas field in Europe and the tenth 
largest in the world. Recently it has accounted for approximately 50% of natural gas p roduction  in the 
Netherlands and has been projected to last for another 50 years. However, in response to earthquakes in  the 
region, the Dutch government has capped production for the foreseeable future, and Dutch gas production is  
forecast to decline significantly by 2020. In 2017 the Netherlands became a ne t importe r of  gas . LNG is 
imported into the Netherlands’ only LNG import terminal, the Gate terminal, in the Port of Rotterdam.  
Gate terminal. The Gate (Gas Access to Europe) terminal was officia lly opened in  September 2011. It is  
located on the Maasvlakte in Rotterdam, and consists of three storage tanks, three jetties and a regasification 
process area. The terminal was developed to address the rising demand for gas in North West Europe due to 
declining gas production in that region. It has an initial capacity of 12 bcm/year (with the potential of being 
increased to 16 bcm/year with the addition of a fourth LNG tank) and delivers gas in to the Dutch gas 
transport network. Since August 2016 the Gate terminal has operated a th ird berth and specialised new 
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infrastructure for the loading of small LNG vessels, which strengthens Gate’s role as a hub terminal in North 
West Europe. The terminal added two truck loading facilities in 2017.  
4.3.9 Poland  
Although Poland has significant (but declining) domestic gas production, it is a net importer of gas – primarily 
from Russia. In 2017 Poland imported 1.61 bcm of LNG and was Europe’s seventh largest importer of LNG. 
Poland remains heavily dependent on coal as a primary energy source, and the vast majority of e lectricity 
generation in Poland is coal-based. Poland is seeking to diversify its energy mix, with natural gas and other 
energy sources becoming a strategic priority. Natural gas is the third most important energy source consumed 
in Poland after coal and crude oil, accounting for approximately 14% of consumption. The f irst commerc ia l 
cargo of LNG was delivered to Poland’s only LNG import terminal, the Swinoujscie terminal, in July 2016.  
Swinoujscie Terminal. The Swinoujscie LNG terminal is Poland’s flagship project to diversify gas supplies and 
reduce dependence on gas pipeline imports from Russia. The terminal is able to receive, regasify and deliver 5 
bcm of gas per annum into the Polish national grid. It consists of a 3 km long breakwater, a jetty that is  ab le 
to unload carriers with the capacity ranging from 120,000 m3 to 217,000 m3, two 160,000 m3 LNG storage 
tanks and regasification facilities. 
4.3.10 Portugal  
Portugal does not produce any natural gas and is wholly dependent on imports for its  gas requirements 
(about 4 bcm/year). In 2017 Portugal imported 3.4 bcm of LNG and was Europe’s sixth largest importer of  
LNG. Natural gas is imported into Portugal via the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline from Algeria and Portugal’s 
only LNG terminal, Sines LNG. In 2015 net LNG imports to Portugal grew to 1.12 bcm, representing a 16.2% 
increase from 2014. In 2017 Portugal imported 2.71 bcm of LNG, marking an increase of 107.3 % in 
comparison with 2016.  
Sines Terminal. The Sines LNG terminal is located on Portugal’s Atlantic coast, in the Sines port about 120 km 
to the south of Lisbon. The terminal started operations on 26 October 2003 and consists of a docking station 
for ships with capacity from 40,000 m3 to 216,000 m3, three storage tanks with a combined capac ity of 
390,000 m3 and seven open-rack vaporisers for LNG regasification. More than 230 LNG carriers have called 
at the facility since operations began, with the majority supplying LNG from Nigeria. 
4.3.11 Spain  
Spain has one of the highest levels of natural gas consumption in Europe but only produces less than 0.5% of 
the gas it consumes. This makes Spain Europe’s largest importer of LNG. In 2017 it imported 15.39  bcm of 
LNG. With six LNG import terminals currently in operation, Spain has more regasification capacity than any 
other European country. A seventh terminal, El Musel, has been in hibernation since it was completed in 2013. 
Spain’s six operating LNG terminals have a regasification capacity of 60 bcm/year. New LNG import terminals  
on the Spanish islands of Tenerife and Gran Canaria will come into operation in 2021 and 2022, respectively. 
Both terminals will have a nominal capacity of 1.3 bcm/ year, with plans to increase capacity to 2 bcm/year in 
the future.  
Barcelona LNG Terminal. The Barcelona terminal is the oldest regasification terminal in  Spain,  beginning 
operations in 1969. The initial facilities consisted of two storage tanks with a combined capacity of 80,000 
m3, but several additions have been carried out throughout the years, with an e ighth tank been added in 
2011. The terminal’s send-out capacity stands now at 17.1 bcm/year. Since December 2010 the terminal can 
receive LNG vessels of up to 266,000 m3. It provides truck loading services for up to 50 trucks a day and the 
loading of bunkering of ships services are being developed.  
Cartagena LNG Terminal. The Cartagena LNG terminal is located in southern Spain. It started ope ration  in 
1989 and originally consisted of a single storage tank, send-out facilities and a single container berth of 
40,000 m3. Storage tanks were added and in October 2010 a f ifth tank of 150,000 m3 entered in to 
operation. The send-out capacity currently stands at 11.8 bcm/year. Since 2009 the  terminal has been 
capable of receiving vessels of up to 266,000 m3. The capability of loading bunkering ships was completed in 
mid-2017. The terminal can also offer LNG truck loading for up to 50 trucks a days, as well as trans -
shipment services for small and large vessels.  
Huelva LNG Terminal. The Huelva LNG plant is located in Andalusia. It began operations in 1988 and had 
initially a single storage tank with a capacity of 60,000 m3. The terminal underwent its first expansion when 
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the Seville-Madrid gas network pipeline was built, and subsequent expansions were carried out to  bring the 
terminal’s storage capacity up to 619,500 m3 and its send-out capacity up to 11.8 bcm/year. The terminal is 
capable of receiving ships with a capacity of up to 173,400 m3. The terminal offers ship loading and cooling 
down and gassing up services for ships between 29,500 m3 and 173,400 m3 as well as truck loading 
services for approximately 50 trucks per day. Loading of bunkering ships is being considered.  
Bilbao Bahía De Bizkaia Terminal. The Bahía de Bizkaia LNG terminal is located near Bilbao. It began 
operations in 2003 and underwent an expansion in 2015 with the addition of a third 150,000 m3 tank, which 
increased the terminal’s storage capacity to 450,000 m3. The terminal supplies gas for commercial 
consumption but also for producing electricity in nearby Bahía de Bizkaia Electricidad (BBE) 800 MW combined 
cycle electric power plant. Since November 2015 the terminal has provided truck loading services. The 
terminal completed the adaption of its jetty, which is now compatib le with large-scale and small-scale 
reloading/bunkering operations.  
Sagunto Terminal. The Sagunto terminal is located nearby Valencia. Its location is ideal for both the LNG- 
producing countries of North Africa and the Persian Gulf and the energy consumers in the Mediterranean. It 
began operations in February 2006 and initially comprised a jetty, a regasification facility and two 150,000 
m3 storage tanks. The terminal currently consists of four 150,000 m3 storage tanks, six vaporisers and all 
the infrastructure required for unloading methane tankers, storage, regasification of LNG and consignment of 
natural gas to the network, as well as a tanker-truck loading facility. The terminal satisfies up to 25% of the 
gas demand throughout Spain. Since 2011 the terminal has offered truck loading services, and since 2013 it 
has offered ship reloading. 
Mugardos (El Ferrol) Terminal. The Mugardos LNG terminal is located on the north-western coast of Spain in  
the Galicia region. The terminal received its first cargo in May 2007 and went into operation in November of 
that year, becoming Spain’s sixth receiving LNG terminal. The majority of the gas generated at the terminal is  
consumed by gas-fired power plants located nearby. There are plans to add two more 150,000 m3 storage 
tanks and to increase capacity to 7.2 bcm/year over the next ten years.  
El Musel Terminal. El Musel terminal is located in Gijon, on the northern coast of  Spain. The p lant was 
completed in 2013 but was immediately mothballed, and under Spain’s Royal Decree 13/2012, El Musel will 
remain in “hibernation” until gas demand rises. The site was designed for expansion, with plans to  install an 
additional two tanks in the second phase of the project, taking total storage capacity up to 600,000 m3.  
4.3.12 United Kingdom  
The UK is one of the two major gas-producing nations in the EU (the other being the Netherlands). In  2017 
the UK imported 6.17 bcm of LNG and was Europe’s fifth largest importer of LNG. Production of gas in the UK 
has been in decline since 2009, and since 2004 the UK has been a net importe r of  gas . The UK imports 
natural gas by pipeline from Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, and by LNG to its three operational large-
scale LNG terminals: Grain LNG, Dragon LNG and South Hook LNG. When the Grain LNG terminal came into 
operation, UK’s regasification capacity increased by 147%. By 2014 the UK’s LNG imports had dec lined by 
45% from their 2011 peak; however, 2014 saw a 21% increase in LNG imports, driven in part by weaker than 
expected prices in Asia. In 2015 net LNG imports grew a further 12.4% to  9.43 bcm,  making the UK the  
largest importer of LNG in Europe. In 2017, UK LNG imports fell by approximately 34.7% compared with 2016 
and the UK dropped to being the fifth largest importer of LNG in Europe.  
Grain LNG Terminal. The Grain LNG terminal is located on the Isle of Grain in Kent. The first commercial cargo 
of LNG arrived at Grain in September 2005. The terminal was expanded in 2008 to accommodate an 
additional 9.3 bcm per year and again in 2010 when a further 6.9 bcm per year of capacity was added. Grain  
LNG is planning a further expansion to increase the terminal’s capacity from 19.5 bcm/year to  up to  27.5 
bcm/year towards the end of 2020 and will make it the largest import terminal in Europe. The Grain  LNG 
terminal offers cooling down and ship reloading services, and road tanker loading services, and was the f irst 
UK facility to offer reloading. Small-scale ship reloading facilities are being considered.  
Dragon LNG Terminal. The Dragon LNG terminal is located at Milford Haven in west Wales. It came into 
operation in 2009. The terminal has a maximum gas send-out rate of 7.6 bcm/year.  
South Hook LNG. South Hook, also located at Milford Haven, was commissioned in 2009. And has a capacity 
of 21 bcm/year, making it the largest LNG receiving terminal in Europe.  
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4.4 Main Failure Modes of LNG regasification plants 
The CEN standards generally propose a subdivision of hazards for LNG plants in two classes,  depending on 
the origin of the threat: (1) hazards of internal origin, arising from both LNG and non-LNG re lated p rocess 
operations and loss of containment; and (2) hazards of external origin, arising from outside the p lant. The 
hazards of internal origin can be further distinguished in (1.a) hazards related to loss of containment of LNG 
or natural gas and (1.b) hazards which are not specific of natural gas. The hazard related to loss of 
containment of LNG and natural gas depend on the hazardous properties of these materia ls and on the 
process conditions. 
LNG and natural gas are flammable materials, and may be found in the plant at low temperatures and/or 
high pressure. The standard EN 1160:1996 identifies three main potentially hazardous characteristics of LNG: 
 It is extremely cold (it boils at about -160°C, and the vapour at that temperature is more dense than 
ambient air); 
 Small volumes of liquid are converted into large volumes of gas (approximately 600 normal volumes 
of gas per volume of liquid); 
 It is a flammable hydrocarbon gas (the flammable mixture range with air is from approximately 5% 
to 15% gas by volume, at ambient conditions). 
The hazards related to loss of containment of LNG and natural gas are considered for all items of equipment 
in the plant, including the loading or unloading of road tankers or LNG carriers. For example,  in the hazard 
assessment of storage tanks, the internal threats to integrity to be assessed include:  
 Mechanical failure (e.g. thermal shock, corrosion, frost heave of foundation, leakage of flanges); 
 Equipment failure (relief valves, liquid level gauging etc.); and 
 Operational and maintenance errors (overfilling, rollover, dropped pump, overpressure etc.) 
Internal hazards which are not specific to LNG are related to the presence of other hazardous materials  and 
equipment in the plant. Qualitatively, they do not differ from the analogous hazards commonly found in 
process and chemical industries, for instance: Poor communication between ship and shore; Traffic within the 
plant; Leakage of other hazardous substances; Missiles originating from explosion; Pressurised and steam 
raising equipment; Fired heaters and boilers; Rotating machinery; Electrical installations; Harbour installations 
associated with the LNG plant; Security issues (e.g.: Intrusion, sabotage); Accidents during construction  and 
maintenance; Escalation of accidents. In Section 4.4.1 we discuss more in details internal hazards.  
Considering the hazard of external origin, hazards typical of chemical & process plants are generally included, 
such as: exposure to sea conditions; LNG carriers approaching the berth at excess ive speed or angle;  the 
possibility of collision with the jetty and/or LNG carrier at berth by heavy displacement vessels passing the 
berth; impact of projectiles and consequences of collision (ship, truck, plane); natural climatic events (lightning, 
flooding, earthquakes, tidal bores, icebergs, tsunamis); proximity of airports and/or f light -paths,  including 
helicopter crashes; domino effects resulting from fires and/or explosions at adjacent p remises ; te rrorist 
attacks, and so forth. In Section 4.4.2 we discuss more in details external hazards.  
The remainder of this section was developed mainly relying on the analysis carried out by the INtreg project2. 
iNTeg-Risk (Early Recognition, Monitoring, and Integrated Management of Emerging, New Technology related 
Risks) was a FP7 project that coordinated research and development sub-projects related to  new materia ls 
and technologies for establishing a common EU approach to face the challenge of emerging risks. One of 
such sub-projects investigated the management of emerging risks related to technologies available for LNG 
regasification terminals (iNTeg-Risk project 2011a). 
The methodology for the quantification of risk from installations handling toxic or flammable substances can 
in broad terms be separated into three major phases: (1) the assessment of plant damage states and their 
frequency of occurrence; (2) the assessment of consequences of toxic or flammable substances release;  and 
(3) the risk ranking (iNTeg-Risk project 2011b). 
The assessment of plant-damage states consists in the analysis of the installation to  identify potential 
accident initiators, assess the response of the plant to these initiators and establish end damage states of the 
plant resulting in the release of a dangerous substance in the environment. The main  sources of potential 
                                     
2 http ://www.integrisk.eu-vri.eu/ 
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hazardous-substance releases are first identified and the initiating events that can cause such re leases are 
determined. A logic model for the installation is then developed. The model includes each and every in itiator 
of potential accidents and the response to the installation to these initiators. Specific accident sequences are 
defined (event trees) consisting of an initiating event, specific system failures or successes and their timing,  
and human responses. System failures are in turn modelled (in models called fault trees) in  terms of basic  
component failures and human errors to identify their basic causes and to allow for the quantification of the 
system failure probabilities and accident sequence frequencies. Plant damage states are defined to un iquely 
characterize the installation-dependent conditions of release of the hazardous substance. Accident sequences 
resulting into the same conditions of release are grouped into groups each corresponding to a particular plant 
damage state. The final step consists of calculating frequency of occurrence for each identified acc ident 
sequence and consequently of each plant damage state. Normally these assessments are aimed at 
establishing consequences to the public and worker’s health, and not plant availability. 
The second phase of a typical risk assessment aims at the establishment of the consequences of the released 
hazardous substances. For toxic substances the assessment of the consequences invo lves determining 
release categories for toxic materials, simulating the atmospheric dispersion of such materials, assessing the 
doses that workers and the public will be exposed and finally assessing the consequences. A parallel set of 
steps can be distinguished for the assessment of the consequences of released flammable substances. In  
particular, the consequence assessment consists of the use of appropriate dose/response models that receive 
as input the dose of heat radiation or overpressure and calculate the probability of fatality or injury of the 
individual receiving the dose. 
In this last phase, the frequencies of the various accidents are integrated with the corresponding 
consequences, resulting in the quantification (or ranking) of risk. Two risk measures are usually used to  
quantify risk: individual fatality risk at a location and group fatality risk in a given area. 
4.4.1 Internal hazards 
As discussed, a typical LNG regasification terminal comprises the following main sections: the jetty,  storage 
tanks, vaporizers, the boil-off recovery system, and auxiliary and safety systems. The section of auxiliary 
systems includes all the principal process support activities (principal and emergency e lectric  energy, f ire 
control system, refrigeration system, etc.). Three main operating states of the installation are normally 
considered: (a) the loading of LNG from the ship to the tank; (b) the storage of LNG in the tanks; and (c) the 
transfer of LNG from the tank to the pipeline. (iNTeg-Risk project 2011a) identified four critical sections of the 
plant.  
Unloading arm section, comprising the jetty, the unloading arms for the LNG transfer from ship to tanks and 
the transfer pipeline from the jetty to the storage tanks. 
Storage Tanks section, comprising containment tanks with associated piping and pumps. 
Absorption / Vaporizer section, comprising the absorption tower, vaporizers as well as their pumping system 
and the transfer line to distribution net.  
Boil-off recovery section, comprising the cryogenic compressors and the blower.  
4.4.2 External hazards 
(iNTeg-Risk project 2011a) revised a number of available sources to identify and discuss threats assoc iated 
to external hazards (natural hazards and to intentional malic ious acts)  sess ions . Several sources were 
analysed, from industrial practice (HazId guidewords used in a major oil company, the California State Is land 
Commission study on Port Cabrillo LNG Port, the EIA study of LNG terminal in Hong-Kong), various standards 
applicable to LNG facilities and equipment (EN 1473:2007; EN 13645:2001; EN 14620:2006; EN 1474:2008) 
and from security/vulnerability assessment studies (such as Sandia, SVA Port Cabrillo, SFK and API). From the 
list of threats derived from these sources, security-related threats were merged and consolidated as follows: 
 Deliberate misoperation/manipulation by insider; 
 Interference by insider; 
 Arson by insider; 
 Hijacking (and misoperation/manipulation, interference, arson or use of explosives); 
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 Hijacking and ramming/collision/grounding; 
 Intentional collision by vehicle/ship/airplane/helicopter; 
 Intentional collision with carrier of explosive devices/mine; 
 Shooting (large/small missiles); 
 Cascade of man-made incidents outside the plant; 
 Theft of hazardous substances. 
Table 4. Typical threats related to external actions and environment  for LNG regasification facility. 
Natural 
Climate extremes 
Temperature (extreme high/low), waves/swells, extreme current, 
flooding, tides/tidal waves/bores, wind/typhoons/squalls, hurricane , 
tornado, dust, sandstorms, snow, blizzards, ice, icebergs, high 
humidity, reduced visibility 
Lightning  
Seismic activity Earthquakes, Tsunami  
Erosion Ground slide, coastal, river  
Subsidence/movement Ground structure, foundations, mooring structure  
Man Made  
Terrorist activity 
Direct attack leading to loss of containment (Deliberate 
misoperation and/or manipulation by insider, Arson by insider, 
Hijacking and misoperation and/or manipulation, interference, 
arson or use of explosives), Hijacking and ramming, col lision, 
grounding, Intentional collision by vehicle, ship, airplane, helicopter, 
Intentional collision with carrier of explosive devices/mine, Shooting 
(large/small missiles), Cascade of man-made incidents outside t he  
plant, Theft of hazardous substances 
Social instability Riots, civil disturbance, strikes, military action, political unrest  
P revious site 
contamination 
Base line study, chemical, organic, radioactive  
Third party activities Farming, Fishing, Local industry, Commercial and touristic ships 
Collisions & impacts 
Internal sources of 
impact 
Dropped object, In-facility vehicles, Layout hazards  
External sources of 
impact 
Marine collision, Helicopter impact, FSRU listing, LNG carrier listing , 
Aircraft crash, External vehicles, Layout hazards, Displacement 
from nearby heavy vessels  
Industrial domino Neighbouring plants/facilities, Layout hazards 
Other external sources of 
ignition 
HV cables, Layout hazards, high energy radio waves 
Structure stability & 
positioning  
Loss of structural 
stability 
Fatigue/cracking, Structural/foundation failure, Tank sloshing, Loss  
of station keeping, Loss of buoyancy, Foundering, loss of stability  
Loss of position, drifting 
Mooring line failure, Loss of station keeping, Structural failure, 
grounding 
Source : (iNTeg-Risk project 2011c). 
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This list was then merged to threats related to natural hazards and to specific threats present for floating or 
off-shore units, obtaining the list summarised in Table 4 of typical threats related to  external ac tions and 
environment. 
4.4.3 Initiating events and plant damage states 
All initiating events (related to both internal and external hazards) and corresponding plant damage states 
identified by (iNTeg-Risk project 2011a) are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. List of initiating events, plant damage states and release categories of the on shore plant . 
Initiating Events P lant Damage State 
Unlading section 
1. Corrosion Hole  in p ip ing 
2. Boil off removal malfunction during unloading Pipe  rupture 
3. Excess external heat in je tty during unloading  
4. Excess external heat during unloading Pipe  rupture 
5. Pressure shock (Inadvertent valve closure during unloading) Pipe  rupture (ship to tank) 
6. Earthquake  Pipe  rupture 
7. Inadequate cooling of loading arm Pipe  rupture 
8. Snow, ice  Pipe  rupture 
9. Floods Pipe  rupture 
10. High winds Pipe  rupture 
11. Extra loads Pipe  rupture 
12. Valve  left open before unloading starts Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
13. Containment bypass during unloading Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
14. Damage in boil off gas return p ipe Gas p ipe rupture 
LNG tank (Loading phase)  
15. Corrosion Hole  in tank 
16. Boil off removal malfunction during loading Tank rupture owing to overpressure 
17. Excess external heat during loading Tank rupture owing to overpressure 
18. Leve l rise  beyond safety height, or overfilling  Tank rupture owing to overpressure 
19. Rollover Tank rupture owing to overpressure 
20. Earthquake Catastrophic rupture of tank 
21. Snow, ice  Catastrophic rupture of tank 
22. Floods Catastrophic rupture of tank 
23. Extra loads Catastrophic rupture of tank 
24. Valve  left open before loading starts  Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
25. Containment bypass during loading Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
LNG tank (Storage phase)  
26. Corrosion Hole  in tank 
27. Boil off removal malfunction during storage Tank rupture owing to overpressure 
28. Excess external heat during storage Tank rupture owing to overpressure 
29. Rollover Tank rupture owing to overpressure 
30. Earthquake Catastrophic rupture of tank 
31. Snow, ice  Catastrophic rupture of tank 
32. Floods Catastrophic rupture of tank 
33. Extra loads Catastrophic rupture of tank 
34. Valve  left open Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
35. Containment bypass during storage Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
LNG tank (Unloading phase) 
36. Corrosion Hole  in tank 
37. Boil off removal malfunction Tank rupture owing to overpressure 
38. Inadvertent start of additional compressor Tank rupture owing to underpressure 
39. Excess external heat during unloading Tank rupture owing to overpressure 
40. Continuation of unloading beyond lower safety level Tank rupture owing to  underpressure 
41. Increased send out rate  from tank Tank rupture owing to underpressure 
42. Earthquake Catastrophic rupture of tank 
43. Snow, ice  Catastrophic rupture of tank 
44. Floods Catastrophic rupture of tank 
45. Extra loads Catastrophic rupture of tank 
46. Valve  closure after pumps Pipe  rupture 
47. Valve  left open before unloading starts Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
48. Containment bypass during unloading Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
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Initiating Events P lant Damage State 
Recondenser and vaporizer section 
49. Corrosion Hole  in equipment 
50. Excess external heat Equipment rupture owing to overpressure 
51. Pressure shock Pipe  rupture 
52. Earthquake Catastrophic rupture of equipment 
53. Snow, ice  Catastrophic rupture of equipment 
54. Floods Catastrophic rupture of equipment 
55. Extra loads Catastrophic rupture of equipment 
56. Valve  left open Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
57. Containment bypass Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
Boil-Off recovery section 
58. Corrosion Hole  in equipment 
59. Excess external heat Equipment rupture owing to overpressure 
60. Earthquake Catastrophic rupture of equipment 
61. Snow, ice  Catastrophic rupture of equipment 
62. Floods Catastrophic rupture of 
63. Extra loads Catastrophic rupture of equipment 
64. Valve  left open Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
65. Containment bypass Exit of LNG through 1inch drainage valve 
66. Increased flow rate Catastrophic rupture of recondenser 
67. Pump malfunction (exit of recondenser) Catastrophic rupture of recondenser 
Send out pipeline 
66. Pipebreak owing to corrosion Small hole  on p ipe skin(Leakage) 
67. Pipebreak owing to external heat Overpressure creates small hole  
68. Pipebreak owing to pressure  shock- closed valve in send out Pipe  rupture 
69. Pipebreak owing to containment bypass Exit of LNG through sampling valves 
70. Vaporiser failure Pipe  rupture 
Source : (iNTeg-Risk project 2011a). 
Screening of the initiating events was performed on the basis of their release category. Release categories 
with relatively small releases were not quantified. For example liquid releases which occur if there is 
containment bypass or corrosion in the LNG tank were ignored and the corresponding initiating events not be 
quantified. Containment bypass was also ignored in the unloading and loading section of the LNG tank. The  
initiating event of earthquake was not be considered as being beyond the scope of that analysis. The initiating 
events that were subject to quantification in the iNTeg-Risk project are summarised in Table 6 and expla ined 
more in detail in the following. 
Boil off removal malfunction during unloading from ship to tank. During unloading of LNG from ship to  tank 
the operation of one compressor is required to remove LNG vapours and keep the p ressure  with in safety 
limits. Any deviation of the boil-off removal safety system from the required operation initiates a trans ient 
and requires certain safety functions to avoid release of LNG. 
Excess external heat during unloading from ship to tank. During unloading of LNG from ship  to tank excess 
external heat or higher than expected temperature in product may cause an additional demand on the boil off 
removal capacity of the storage facility. The extra demand initiates a transient and requires ce rtain safety 
functions to avoid release of LNG. 
External fire during unloading from ship to tank. During unloading of LNG from ship to tank an external fire in 
jetty may ignite and due to the higher thermal heat flux which is radiated towards the pipes increasing bo il 
off removal capacity is required, and has to be handled through the safety functions of the plant. 
Inadvertent valve closure during unloading from ship to tank . During unloading of LNG from ship to  tank a 
valve may close abruptly causing a water hammer in the loading arm. The inadvertent closure of the valve 
causes a sudden increase in pressure in the pipe and initiates a transient that requires ce rtain safety 
functions to avoid water hammer and release of LNG. 
Inadequate cooling of loading arm during unloading from ship to tank. During unloading of LNG from ship to 
tank the inadequate cooling of the loading arm may cause an abrupt temperature rise that may cause a 
pressure increase. This abnormality initiates a transient and requires certain safety functions to avoid release 
of LNG. 
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Table 6. List of possible initiating events for LNG regasification facility. 
Unloading Section 
1. Boil off removal malfunction during unloading from ship to  tank 
2. Excess external heat during unloading from ship to  tank 
3. Excess fire  in je tty during unloading 
4. Inadvertent valve closure during unloading 
5. Inadvertent cooling of loading arm 
6. High winds 
LNG tank 
7. Leve l rise  beyond safety height, or overfilling 
8. Rollover in tank during unloading 
9. Rollover in tank during storage 
10. Inadvertent starting of additional Compressors 
11. Boil off removal malfunction during storage 
12. External fire  near tank 
13. Continuation of unloading beyond lower safety level (Low level in tank) 
14. Increase send out rate from tank 
Loading section (from refrigerated tank to pumps and heater)  
15. Closed valve in sendout from tank 
16. Increased flow rate to recondenser 
17. Booster pumps malfunction 
18. External fire  near recondenser 
19. Vaporiser failure 
20. Strong waves during unloading (only for offshore plant) 
21. Strong waves during storage (only for offshore  plant) 
Source : (iNTeg-Risk project 2011a). 
 
High winds/ waves in loading arm during unloading from ship to tank. During unloading of LNG from ship to  
tank the presence of high winds initiates a transient and requires certain safety functions to avoid release of 
LNG. 
High level in tank during unloading from ship to tank. During the loading of LNG from ship to tank, an excess 
level may occur, should the loading process not stop (in the ship) once the amount of LNG necessary to reach 
the upper safety limit has been unloaded. Such an event, if unchecked, may lead to the failure of the tank 
and/or of the piping connecting the ship with the tank. The successful mitigation of this event requires the  
success of certain safety functions. 
Rollover in tank during unloading from ship to tank. During the loading of LNG from ship to tank, a variation in 
the LNG density or temperature may cause a rollover inside the tanks due to the difference between the o ld 
and the new product. Such an event, if unchecked, may lead to the fa ilure of the tank. The successful 
mitigation of this event requires the success of certain safety functions. 
Rollover in tank during storage. During the storage of LNG, a variation in the LNG density or temperature may 
cause a rollover inside the tanks. Such an event, if unchecked,  may lead to  the fa ilure of the tank. The 
successful mitigation of this event requires the success of certain safety functions. 
Inadvertent Starting of Compressor during storage. Such an event initiates an accident in tank, since it causes 
an excessive pressure reduction in it owing to the higher boil off gas removal rate, and requires the success of 
certain safety functions to avoid the release of LNG. 
Boil off removal malfunction during storage. During storage of LNG boil off removal is required to keep the 
pressure within safety limits. Any deviation of the boil-off removal safety system from the required operation 
initiates a transient and requires certain safety functions to avoid release of LNG. 
External fire near tank. An external fire may ignite near the tank and has to be handled through the safety 
functions of the plant. 
Low level in tank during send out. This event may happen during the send out of the tank, when the unloading 
is continued beyond the lower safety level. If the LNG pumping still continues in the tank, a pressure drop will 
be registered. The same phenomenon can be observed during the storage phase of the plant, if the send out 
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procedure is inadvertently initiated and continued. The loss of level triggers an acc ident sequence and 
requires certain safety functions to avoid release of LNG. 
Increased send out rate from tank. This event may occur during the send out of the tank, when the unloading 
rate is increased unexpectedly. If the LNG pumping continues operating, a pressure drop will be registered. 
The pressure drop triggers an accident sequence and requires certain safety functions to  avo id release of 
LNG. 
Closed valve in send out from tank. This event corresponds to a closed valve in send out that may block the 
flow and cause a pressure increase. This event usually corresponds to a human error that triggers an accident 
sequence and requires certain safety functions to avoid release of LNG. 
Inadvertent Starting of Compressor to recondenser. Such an event initiates an accident in recondenser, since it 
causes an excessive pressure increase in it, owing to high gas inlet, and this requires the success of certa in 
safety functions to avoid the release of LNG. 
Booster pumps malfunction at the exit of recondenser. Such an event initiates an accident in recondenser, 
since it causes an excessive pressure increase in it, owing to the blockage of the vessel ex it. Th is  s ituation  
requires the success of certain safety functions to avoid the release of LNG. 
External fire near recondenser. An external fire may ignite near the recondenser vessel and has to be handled 
through the safety functions of the plant. 
Vaporizer failure. This event corresponds to a vaporizer failure that may result in letting liqu id natural gas 
pass in the outlet piping. This event triggers an accident sequence and requires certain safety functions to  
avoid pipe break and release of natural gas. 
Strong waves during unloading . During unloading of LNG from ship to tank the presence of strong waves 
initiates a transient and requires certain safety functions to avoid release of LNG. The re lease may be the  
result of the impact of the ship on the offshore facility. 
Strong waves during storage. During storage the presence of strong waves or currents initiates a transient 
and requires certain safety functions to avoid release of LNG. The release may be the result of the movement 
of the offshore facility due to the strong waves. 
4.4.4 Conclusion on main failure modes of LNG regasification plants 
The more critical plant damage states are those associate with the potential of releasing critical quantities of 
LNG into the environment. These were identified as below: 
 LNG Tank 
1. Tank rupture (roof failure) owing to overpressure 
2. Tank rupture (roof failure) owing to overfilling 
3. Tank rupture owing to under-pressure 
 Loading section 
4. Tank rupture (roof failure) owing to overpressure 
 Unloading section 
5. Tank rupture (roof failure) owing to overpressure 
 Send-out pipeline 
6. Tank rupture owing to under-pressure 
4.4.5 Available data on LNG incidents 
The International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL) has developed a programme for 
collecting and analysing safety incidents in the facilities of its members. Acton et al. provides a summary of 
this programme and the main conclusions that can be derived from it. Data collected in th is p rogramme 
correspond to the period 1965 – 2007 and fed a database. The authors of this this document are not aware 
of any update of the report of Acton et al. with data obtained after 2007. 
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Data were collected by means of a questionnaire developed by a Technical Study Group  and shared with 
members of GIIGNL. The main focus of this questionnaire was on incidents involving releases of hazardous 
materials (LNG, Liquefied Petroleum Gases – LPG, Natural Gas Liquids - NGL, liquid Nitrogen, or other 
hydrocarbon gases) that lead or with the potential to lead to injuries to people or damage  to equipment or 
buildings, but also on near misses and on other incidents of concern. 
Eventually, by the time of reporting the databased contained 328 incidents. Among the variables used to  
classify incidents is the quantity of released material, which is divided in three ranges: le ss than 1 00 kg , 
between 100 kg and 1,000 kg and above 1,000 kg. Incidents were also grouped according to the function  of 
the equipment where the incident took place. The groups used were similar to the initiating events considered 
in section 4.4.3: unloading, storage, send-out, external and other. Incidents during unloading are the most 
frequent per hour of operation, although authors stress that the number of operating ours corresponding to  
unloading is relatively infrequent operation compared with other activities in an LNG plant, typically 16  – 20  
hours per week.  
The accumulated operative experience contributing to this database is 1,320 site-years, 5,816 tank-years,  
53,295 ship-voyages and 2,556 bcm. Table 7 contains the summary of incidents collected of most interest to  
our study. 
 
Table 7. LNG incident frequencies. 
Period Incidents Operating site-years Frequency (incidents/site-year) 
1965-1974 15 44 0.341 
1975-1984 52 179 0.291 
1985-1994 94 327 0.287 
1995-2000 85 191 0.445 
2001-2007 82 579 0.142 
Total 1965-2007 328 1320 0.248 
Source : Acton et al. JRC has rounded off values in the last column to three significant digits instead of to two, as it was in  th e  o rig inal 
source  
 
This table contains very interesting information concerning LNG regasification facilities to be used in a Risk 
Assessment of a gas system. It provides the historical frequencies of occurrence of incidents in LNG plants . 
We can see that the frequency of incidents per site-year stayed approximately stable in the period 1965-
1994, it experienced a significant increase in the period 1995-2000 and dropped a significantly in the period 
2001-20073. The significance of these differences can be checked by performing the corresponding 
hypothesis tests for the fraction of years (or months) that experienced an incident in each period. By doing so 
we reach the conclusion that the entire reporting period can be d ivided in  three periods with d ifferent 
probability of incidents per site-year: Period 1965-1994 with a frequency of 0.293 incidents per site-year, the 
period 1995-2000 with a frequency of 0.445 incidents per site-year,  and the period 2001-2007 with a 
frequency of 0.142 incidents per site-year. 
                                     
3 In this sentence we are using the words significant and significantly with its statistical meaning: th e dif fere nces in  f re quencies  of  
incidents among the different periods are  either statistically significant or not. To be able to make the statements in this sentence we  
have performed the co rresponding hypothesis tests for two Poisson variables, adopting as null hypothesis H0: λ1=λ2, and as alternativ e  
hypothesis H1 λ1≠λ2. The  tests of hypothesis among the periods 1965-1974 and 1975-1984, 1975-1984 and 1985-1994, and 1 96 5 -
1974 and 1985-1994 resulted in respective P-values of 0.66, 0.96 and 0.68 which clearly indica te  co mple te  la ck o f  s ignif ica nt 
differences. This took as to consider definite ly the period 1965-1994 as a homogeneous period with a constant fre quency of incidents.  
Three more tests were done comparing periods 1965-1994 and 1995-2000, 1995-2000 and 2001-2007, and 1965-1994 and 2001 -
2007. The largest P-value of these three hypothesis tests was 0.006, which leads to a clear re jection of the null hypothesis in the three 
cases. There  is a clear statistical evidence to support the statement that the frequencies of incidents  o f th es e th ree  perio d s a re  
different. See Annex 3 for details. 
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Taking into account that most of these incidents take the plant to stop the normal activity in order to  avoid 
any escalation, these frequencies may be taken as estimates of the probability of non-availability of the plant 
to deliver gas to the national gas transmission network, or equivalently probability of failure of the facility. 
The problem we face now is which of the three, or four estimates, if we consider also the average frequency 
over the entire period (0.248 incidents per site-year), should be taken. Th is is  particu larly d ifficult to  do  
because of the non-smooth evolution of the frequency over time, with an increase after a long stable period 
of time followed by a sharp drop (0.445 to 0.142). This decision is d iff icult to  adopt without additional 
information. One possibility would be to take 0.142 as an optimistic estimate, 0.445 as a pessimistic estimate 
and 0.248 as a central estimate. The fact that the estimate 0.445 is the one obtained with the smallest 
observation period (191 site-years vs 550 and 579) take us to consider the other estimates more reliable. 
A final remark should be done. All these estimates have been done assuming that incidents occur equally 
probably over each period considered and over all plants reporting to the database. This hypothesis has not 
been confirmed by the authors of this document because we have had access only to  aggregated data . In  
case this hypothesis were not fulfilled, other type of analysis should be performed. Nevertheless, in absence  
of more information, estimates suggested in the previous paragraph are reasonably good to be used in a Risk 
Assessment of a natural gas transmission network. 
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5 Compressor Stations 
Compressor stations are an integral part of the natural gas pipeline network that moves natural gas to  
consumers from production (or at least import) sites. As gas flows through pipelines its movement is  s lowed 
above all by friction over distance and elevation differences, reducing pressure. Compressor stations are thus 
needed to create the required pressure gradients that produce the flow along the pipelines,  and are p laced 
strategically within the transportation pipeline network to maintain gas flow and pressure. Gas transmiss ion 
system operators typically build compressor stations roughly every 100 kilometres.  
Natural gas compression generates heat that must be dissipated before leaving the compressor facility, most 
compressor stations possessing an aerial cooler system for the purpose. As with other fac ilities handling 
fuels, compressor stations must possess a variety of safety systems for protection in the event of 
emergencies such as unanticipated pressure drop or natural gas leakage. Emergency shutdown systems are 
intended to detect abnormal conditions, automatically stop compressor units and isolate and vent compressor 
station gas piping. Other compressor station components include backup generators, metering equipment,  
filtration systems and control/monitoring systems. Natural gas entering a compressor station is  passed 
through scrubbers and filters to remove any liquids and solids/particulate matter and once the gas stream 
has been cleaned, it is directed to individual compressors according to the flow and number of units that are 
needed to handle the scheduled system flow requirements.  
When the required boost in pressure is very high, either large multistage compressors or several compressor 
units operated serially can be used in order to achieve the desired p ressure. In  operational te rms most 
compressor units operate in parallel, individual compressor units handling a fraction of the necessary flow at 
the required additional pressure before directing the gas back into the  pipeline. The  s ize and number of 
compressors installed in each compressor station thus varies based on pipe diameters and the volume of gas 
to be moved. These factors, together with their arrangement, has a significant impact on the availability, fuel 
consumption and capacity of the system (Kurz and Lubomirsky 2011). 
5.1 Types and operation of Compressor Stations 
The matter of selecting the arrangement of compressors in station is usually considered both in the light of 
steady-state aerodynamic performance and regarding transient behaviour,  redundancy strategies and 
slack/growth capabilities. The number of compressors installed in each compressor station  of a pipeline  
system has a significant impact on the availability, fuel consumption, and capacity of the  system and will 
depend on the station’s load profile. 
The operating point of a compressor is determined by a balance between available driver power, the 
compressor characteristic, and the system behaviour. The compressor characteristic also includes the means 
of controlling the compressor, such as variable speed control, ad justable in let guide vanes , suction or 
discharge throttling and recycling. If variable speed control is available, for example if  the driver is  a two -
shaft gas turbine or a variable speed electric motor, it is usually the pre ferred contro l method. A typ ical 
compressor map for a speed-controlled compressor is shown in Figure 9, illustrating the area of possible  
operating points, the lowest flow possible being determined by the surge line. The compressor set point is  
determined by the relationship between pressure ratio (head) and flow dictated by the system. Line B depicts 
a system where suction and discharge pressure are more or less f ixed and thus change very little  with 
changes in flow. Line A shows the typical behaviour of a pipeline, where any change in flow will impact the 
pressure drop due to friction in the pipeline. Line C is typical for storage applications, where the pressure in  
the storage cavity increases with the amount of gas stored. If the compressor is operated at maximum power, 
the initial flow will be high due to the initially low pressure ratio. The more gas is stored in the cavity, the 
higher its pressure, and likewise the required discharge pressure. Being power limited, the operating point then 
moves to a lower flow (Kurz and Lubomirsky 2011)  
In case of a pipeline, the operating point of the compressor is always determined by the power available from 
the driver (Figure 10). In the case of a gas turbine driver, the power is controlled by the gas p roducer speed 
setting and the pipeline characteristic, this point being found at the in tersection between the p ipeline 
characteristic and the available power. Increasing the flow through a pipeline will require more power and 
more compressor head (Kurz and Lubomirsky 2011). 
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Figure 9. Typical compressor map 
 
 
Source : Kurz and Lubomirsky, 2011. 
Figure 10. Compressor operating point variations 
 
 
Source : Kurz and Lubomirsky, 2011. 
Operational flexibility under a larger number of different operating scenarios must be ensured, namely in  
order to cope with hourly, daily, monthly, or seasonal demand variations and considering that the available 
turbine power will depend on the prevalent ambient conditions. Scenarios that arise from failures of one or 
more systems also have to be considered (Ohanian and Kurz 2002). Operating limits due to speed limits are 
undesirable since they mean that the available engine power cannot be used but because a gas turb ine can 
produce far more power at colder ambient temperatures, designs based on worst case ambient  conditions 
may not be optimal. The quest for operational flexibility can be satisfied on various leve ls . While both 
compressor and driver should have a wide operating range, using multiple smaller units  per station rather 
than one large unit is another possible approach where a series or parallel arrangement will impact flexibility. 
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Flow demand and head requirements are often coupled, which is very obvious in pipeline applications whe re 
the pressure drop between stations is directly related to the flow. In other applications operating points are 
limited by the maximum available engine power, as for example in storage operations where the goal is to fill 
the storage cavity as fast as possible by operating the engine at its maximum power. Since the filling starts 
at very low pressure differentials, the flow is initially very high but as the cavity pressure and the p ressure  
ratio increase the flow is reduced. For such applications compressor arrangements that operate two 
compressors in parallel during the initial stage, with the capability to switch to a series operation,  are very 
advantageous (Kurz and Lubomirsky 2011). 
Dynamic studies of pipeline behaviour reveal a distinctly different reaction in station  operating conditions 
than for steady-state calculations. In steady state (or for slow changes) , p ipeline hydraulics  dictate an 
increase in station pressure ratio with increased flow due to the fact that the pipeline pressure losses increase 
with increased flow through the pipeline. However, if a centrifugal compressor receives more driver power and 
increases its speed and throughput rapidly, the station pressure ratio will react very slowly to  th is  change 
because the additional flow initially has to pack the pipeline (with its considerable volume) until changes in  
pressure become apparent. Dynamic changes in operating conditions would lead to a changes in flow without 
significant discharge pressure changes. Because the failure or unavailability of compression units can cause 
significant loss in revenue, the installation of standby units must be considered, or the standby function can 
be covered by oversizing the drivers bearing in mind that oversizing creates an efficiency disadvantage during 
normal operation, when the units would operate in partial load. The failure of a compress ion unit does not 
mean that the entire pipeline ceases to operate but rather that the flow capacity of the pipeline is  reduced .  
Planned shutdowns due to maintenance can be planned during times when lower capacities are required (Kurz 
and Lubomirsky 2011). 
Most compressor stations are fuelled by a portion of the natural gas flowing through the station , a lthough 
some of the units may be electrically powered. Gas-powered compressors may be driven by either 
conventional piston engines or natural gas turbine units, as discussed further below. There may be one or 
more individual compressor units at a station, more often housed in a building to facilitate maintenance. The 
key parameters for the characterization of the compressor stations are thus the  "p rime move r" types of 
engines that drive the different possible compressors types, since significant differences related to 
maintenance, to the downtime repair and to different numbers of parts that could fail can be introduced. 
The three most commonly used combinations are: 
 Turbine/Centrifugal Compressor - a natural gas-fired turbine is used to turn a centrifugal compressor, 
a small portion of natural gas from the pipeline being burned to power the turbine. 
 Electric Motor/Centrifugal Compressor - a centrifugal compressor is driven by a high-voltage electric  
motor. One advantage of electric motors is they need no emission permits since no hydrocarbons are 
burned as fuel. However, a highly reliable source of electric power must be available near the station 
for such units to be considered for an application. 
 Reciprocating Engine/Reciprocating Compressor - large piston engines are fuelled by natural gas from 
the pipeline. Reciprocating pistons, located in cylinder cases on the side of the unit, compress the 
natural gas. The compressor pistons and the power pistons are connected to a common crankshaft. 
The advantage of reciprocating compressors is that the volume of gas pushed through the  pipeline 
can be adjusted incrementally to meet small changes in customer demand. 
When compared with centrifugal compressors, reciprocating compressors typically have higher compress ion 
ratios, lower gas flows and higher efficiencies, being are suitable for low and middle volumes in the whole 
pressure and compression ratio ranges. They are applied mainly in smaller dimension transit gas pipe lines,  
especially multi-cylinder engines with compression pistons and combustion cylinders sharing the same engine 
block that are thus compact and easy to adjust. 
Centrifugal compressors have the advantages of being more stable and of handling much h ighe r f lows. As 
rotation is the only type of motion present, requirements on mainten ance and revis ion are much lower 
compared with reciprocating compressors. The centrifugal compressors are used mainly for compressing very 
high gas volumes at a comparatively low compression ratio but steady pressure value. They are the most 
used compressors in transmission and transit gas pipelines, for gas compression into the underground storage 
or as emergency/reserve power units (combustion turbines of electric generators). One or two-stage machines 
are used for transmission applications, while multi-stage (often with intercoo ling) machines are used for 
injection into underground gas storage. Axial turbo compressors are not used for gas transmission per se but 
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rather in the turbines that drive the centrifugal compressors. The use of the steam turbines i s  very rare as 
mentioned below. 
In more practical terms, a study was commissioned by JRC in order to develop a classification of compressor 
stations, and while the main purpose was the description of the main f ac ility fa ilure modes in te rms of 
causes, taxonomy and effects, it also established a taxonomy of compressor station types. The study was 
performed with JRC input by Tractebel Engineering, a subsidiary of the ENGIE group, and could thus re ly on 
extensive data from the large number of facilities of the parent company, in particular 56 compressor 
stations throughout the EU: 9 in Germany (Bunde, Eischleben, Lippe, Mallnow, Olbernau, Reckrod , Rehden,  
Reuckersdorf and Weisweiler), 5 in Belgium (Berneau, Winksele, Weelde, Zeebrugge and Zelzate), 2 in  France 
(Etrez and Saint-Avit), 18 in Spain (Alcazar de San Juan, Algete, Almendralejo, Baneros, Chinchilla, Cordoba,  
Crevillente, Denia, Haro, Montesa, Navarra, Paterna, Puertollano, Sevilla, Tivissa, Villar de Arnedo, Zamora and 
Zaragoza), 11 in Italy (Enna, Gallese, Istrana, Malborghetto, Masera, Melizzano, Messina, Montesano,  Poggio  
Renatico, Tarsia and Terranova), 5 in Poland (Ciechanow, Kondratki, Szamotuly, Wloclawek and Zambrow), 5 in 
the Czech Republic (Breclav, Hostim, Kralice, Kourim and Veseli n/L) and 1 in Austria (Eggendorf) (Fioravanti et 
al. 2019). 
In terms of types and operation of compressor stations the study concluded that prime mover s iz ing takes 
into account above all company-wide standardization and foreseen market evolution. Installed power was not 
considered a key parameter in establishing the taxonomy since the availability/reliability of the units and their 
maintenance and repair downtimes are not dependent upon units ’ number ,  size or installed power, the 
relevant aspect being rather the station’s functional architecture  and redundancy level. A ll natural gas 
compressors encountered in the study are driven either by electric motors or gas turbines, the drivers  being 
the key parameters in characterizing compressor stations given the fact they introduce significant differences 
regarding maintenance issues, downtime repairs and the different numbers of parts that can fail. On ly one 
steam turbine was encountered (Mallnow, Germany). All compressors were centrifugal multistage units,  
meaning no reciprocating compressors were present (Fioravanti et al. 2019). 
Another important factor was the compressor station redundancy level. The study concluded that the 
compressor redundancy level is normally set at N+1, where N is the number of running compressors and “+1” 
denotes a standby unit. This led to the following considerations: 
 If the number of compressors is greater than 3 the compressor station is considered to have partia l 
redundancy; 
 If the number of compressors is 2 two further scenarios arise: 
o Total redundancy (1 compressor running and 1 in standby) 
o Null redundancy (2 compressors running with no standby available) 
 If the number of compressors is 1 the compressor station has no redundancy.  
In case of partial redundancy the running compressors do not normally handle 100% of their nominal/design 
flow and can thus provide a measure of further redundancy if required. For example, in a 9+1 configuration  
(where a single compressor is in stand-by) 8 running compressors can easily recover a potential lack of f low 
rate due the trip/failure of one unit by working closer to the stonewall point. Based on the considerations 
above, a taxonomy comprising 8 different typologies of equivalent compressor stations was developed,  as 
illustrated in Table 8. N denotes at least 3 machines, “TUCO” stands for turbocompressors,  “MOCO” for 
motocompressors (i.e. electrically-driven compressors), “RP” means Partial Redundancy (e.g. 2 at 50%),  “RN” 
means Null Redundancy and “RT” stands for Total Redundancy. The se typologies were the basis of a 
subsequent functional analysis. It is worth mentioning that a small number of facilities in the EU are 
considerably larger in terms of the number of compressors and total installed power, such as Ommen in the 
Netherlands (16 compressors in total, split between high caloric and low caloric networks) or Baumgarten in  
Austria. It was however considered that these “complex” facilities do not need to be acknowledged specifically 
and analysed as additional categories, as their reliability/availability characteristics do not depend on number 
and size of compressor units but again on their architectural configuration, i.e. ultimately on the redundancy 
level and spare part management philosophy of the facilities (Fioravanti et al. 2019). 
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Table 8. Equivalent compressor stations. 
Type Number of Compressors Type of Compressors Redundancy Level 
1 N TUCO RP 
2 N MOCO RP 
3 2 TUCO RN 
4 2 MOCO RN 
5 2 TUCO RT 
6 2 MOCO RT 
7 1 TUCO RN 
8 1 MOCO RN 
Source : Fioravanti e t al., 2019. 
 
It is thus clear that standby units are not always mandatory because modern gas-turbine-driven compressor 
sets can achieve availabilities above 97% and higher (Kurz and Lubomirsky 2011). It has often been assumed 
that for two-unit stations without a standby unit, a parallel installation of the two units would yield  the best 
behaviour if one unit fails but that a series arrangement of identical compressor sets can yield a lower 
deficiency in flow than a parallel installation (Ohanian and Kurz 2002). This is due to the fact that pipeline  
hydraulics dictate a relationship between the flow through the pipeline and the necessary p ressure  ratio  at 
the compressor station. For parallel units, the failure of one unit forces the remaining unit to  operate at or 
near choke, with a very low efficiency. Identical units in series, upon the failure of one unit,  would initially 
require the surge valve to open, but the remaining unit would soon be able to operate at a good effic iency 
level, thus maintaining a higher flow than in the parallel scenario. Given the fact that the linepack will help to 
maintain the flow to the users, a series installation would often allow for suff icient time to resolve the  
problem (Kurz and Lubomirsky 2011). 
5.2 Failure Data 
A variety of general databases are standardly used to determine compressor station failure rates, in addition  
to the large variety of available recent literature dealing with compressor and compressor station 
fundamentals in terms of both normal operation and main failure types and causes (Mohitpour e t a l. 2008,  
Boyce 2011, Bloch and Geitner 2012). Compressor stations are specifically addressed in  reliab ility data 
estimation studies for various components and facilities of gas transmission networks, where failures rates 
can be found (Chudoba 2014). 
The impact of the type and arrangement of turbomachinery equipment used in compressor stations has been 
discussed in detail in various references, including topics such as costs (capital, installation, maintenance, fuel, 
etc.), efficiency, operating range, emissions, availability, operational flexibility and standby requirements, most 
of which are intimately related to and have implications on facility failure modes (Ohanian and Kurtz  2002, 
Kurz and Lubomirsky 2011). References dealing with obtaining failure probability distributions and developing 
models to predict operating compressor out-of-service parameters, for planning and maintenance 
management purposes, and to evaluate different operation states, can also be found (Pillon et al. 2005).  
The OREDA handbook offers guidance with failure rates for gas turbines connected to  rotary compressors 
with a critical failure rate of 1100 per million hours (including a special note that 85% of the failures result 
from the gear box). The OREDA taxonomy includes many other pieces of hardware in the system which are 
estimated to account for 60% of the non-gear box outages (OREDA, 2014). 
The aforementioned study commissioned by JRC calculated the availability of the aforementioned compressor 
station and demonstrated that (neglecting inferior order contributions) the contribution of the subsystems to 
the station unavailability is mainly due to turbo compressors (74%), Process Control System and Service Air 
System contribute at 9% each, the Gas Cooling System has a contribution of 5% and the Separation  System 
contributes for 3% (mainly due to malfunction of high level switches on condensate separators and 
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condensate tank). Figure 11 illustrates the relative criticality of the main subsystems of a Gas Compression 
station (Fioravanti et al. 2019). 
Figure 11. Criticality of main subsystems. 
 
Source : Fioravanti e t al., 2019. 
It is evident that compressors are the main contributors to the unavailability of the compressor station; it is  
important to include in the failure of compressors and their drivers, since the process control system has a 
non-negligible contribution. The Gas Cooling System has a lower contribution to gas station unavailability and 
the performed HAZID analysis evidenced that this system is not always. The inf luence of the separation  
system is minor but the level switches present in the condensate tank and the condensate separator may 
trigger a plant shut-down, meaning the spurious intervention of these sensors may have a non-neglig ib le 
contribution to system unavailability (Fioravanti et al. 2019). 
Relevant information about gas transportation facilities can also be found in the database created by PHMSA 
(PHMSA 2014), which requires pipeline operators to submit reports for incidents, only major accidents being 
included in practice. The study made use of information on reports of accidents due to techn ical causes or 
human errors (184 accidents) that occurred in compressor stations in the period 1986 – September 2014, as 
illustrated in Figure 12. 
About 50% of accidents are due to Mechanical Failures: in 27% of cases it is expressly reported that the 
failure occurred at the compressor or at the turbine; in 16% of cases the fault location is specified in  piping 
(fittings, gaskets, flanges, valves etc.); in 6% of cases the fault location is not indicated or it is different from 
the others above cited. Another important cause of failure is the malfunction  of controls  or emergency 
shutdown systems, responsible for 27% of the failures (generally by spurious intervention). The lubricant o i l 
system caused 7% of failures (generally leakage of oil that caught fire). Corrosion was responsible for 5% of 
failures. Loss of power, loss of electric power and emergency generators or batte ries failure on demand, 
caused 2% of failures of gas compression stations. Human e rrors (errors during maintenance,  vehicle  
collision, improper operation, etc.) contributed for 10% of total cases of failure of gas compression stations. 
Also of particular interest is a joint research project by four European TSOs (N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, The 
Netherlands; Gaz De France, France; Ruhrgas, Germany; Snam, Italy) which resulted in a methodology and 
software tool for the safety assessment of compressor stations , listing potential hazards to assess 
consequences and likelihood. The main steps can be summarized as the sequence : description of a ll 
components and systems -> characterization of hazards by means of HAZOP (HAZard OPerability study) -> 
modelling of undesired events in a top-down approach Fault Tree Analysis -> assessment of failure  rates 
supported by a Det Norske Veritas reliability assessment for components, systems and human factors -> 
estimation of event frequencies -> calculation of events consequence, analysing explosions, fires and effects 
on people -> overall safety assessment -> safety improvement strategies (Kutrowski et al. 2006). 
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Figure 12. Causes of failure in compressor stations. 
 
 
Source : PHMSA, 2014. 
Also of particular interest is a joint research project by four European TSOs (N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, The 
Netherlands; Gaz De France, France; Ruhrgas, Germany; Snam, Italy) which resulted in a methodology and 
software tool for the safety assessment of compressor stations , listing potential hazards to assess 
consequences and likelihood. The main steps can be summarized as the sequence : description of a ll 
components and systems -> characterization of hazards by means of HAZOP (HAZard OPerability study) -> 
modelling of undesired events in a top-down approach Fault Tree Analysis -> assessment of failure  rates 
supported by a Det Norske Veritas reliability assessment for components, systems and human factors -> 
estimation of event frequencies -> calculation of events consequence, analysing explosions, fires and effects 
on people -> overall safety assessment -> safety improvement strategies (Kutrowski et al. 2006). 
This methodology bears some resemblance to the work implemented in the study commisoned by JRC, which 
resulted in a characterization of failure modes in terms of frequency and flow/pressure effect accord ing to  
types of prime movers and redundancy levels. In order to identify the possible damage classes liable to affect 
the operation of the transportation network, the aforementioned taxonomy (plus another c lass for pump 
failure, cryogenic tank leakage or vaporizer failure at LNG facilities, assumed to consist of 4 storage tanks , 
each with one low pressure pump - 3 pumps being operative and 1 pump in standby - plus 2 operative and 1 
standby high pressure pumps feeding 3 vaporizers, all pumps being driven by electric motors) was analysed 
and damage classes were defined in terms of flow rate reduction (Fioravanti et al. 2019):  
 The 0% flow damage class represents scenarios in which the compressors and the valve that opens 
the bypass all fail simultaneously, resulting in a total absence of gas flow through the station. 
 The 33, 50 and 66% flow damage classes (at nominal p ressure) are scenarios in which each 
percentage of the nominal flow is delivered. 
 The “Bypass” damage class is the case of the compression station complete ly bypassed without 
performing compression (the pressure having essentially its value upstream of the station) without 
flow interruption, caused by the concurrent failure of all the compressors but the correct functioning 
of the bypass valve. 
The flow rate reduction refers to the “nominal” expected flow rate by each typical con figuration. In 
configurations with 3 compressors, 2 compressors running and 1 compressor spare (configurations 1 and 2) 
the 33% and 66% flow damage classes are not applicable. In configurations with 4 compressors, 3 
compressors running and 1 compressor spare (configurations 1a and 2a) the 50% flow damage class is not 
applicable. In configurations s with 2 compressors both running, no spare (configurations 3 and 4) the 33% 
and 66% flow damage classes are not applicable. In configurations with 2 compressors, one spare 
(configurations 5 and 6) the 33%, 50% and 66% flow damage classes are not applicable (one compressor 
running ensures the nominal flow). In configurations with 1 compressor and no spare (configurations 7 and 8) 
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the 33%, 50% and 66% flow damage classes are not applicable (the only compressor ensures the nominal 
flow) (Fioravanti et al. 2019). 
In order to take into account different plant locations, the presence of available stocks , e tc. three log istic 
delay times have been considered: 
 1 h logistic delay time (spare part present in plant warehouse); 
 24 h logistic delay time (spare part shortly available); 
 1 week logistic delay time (spare part not readily available). 
For each configuration the study yielded the following data (Fioravanti et al. 2019): 
 Unavailability (Q): the probability for the system to be in the  conside red damage c lass,  i .e. the  
fraction of time spent by the system in the considered damage class; 
 Expected Number of Failures (ENF): the mean number of failures (leading to the considered damage 
class) expected in the year; 
 Down Time: the cumulative time in the year in which the system is in the considered Damage Class; 
 Average Down Time: the mean down time of the system for a failure leading to the considered 
Damage Class, i.e. the average time that is necessary to recover the fa ilure to  get out from the 
considered Damage Class. 
Results are summarized in Tables 9 10 and 11 below, presenting the 4 parameters above for each 
configuration, for the 3 considered three logistic delay times (Fioravanti et al. 2019). 
 
 
Table 9.  1hr Logistic Delay Time: Unavailability (Q), Expected Number of Failures (ENF), Downtime [h/year], Average 
Downtime [h]. 
Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – 1 hr Logistic Delay Time 
Typical Parameter 
Damage Class (nominal flow percentage) 
66% 50% 33% Bypass 0% 
1: N-TUCO-
RP 
Q X 2,08E-02 X 7,37x10E-04 3,41E-06 
ENF [occ/year] X 4,98E+00 X 2,19E-01 1,05E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 1,82E+02 X 6,46E+00 2,98E-02 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 3,65E+01 X 2,95E+01 2,84E+01 
1a: 4-TUCO-
RP 
Q 3,31E-02 X 4,74E-04 6,51E-04 2,85E-06 
ENF [occ/year] 7,88E+00 X 2,17E-01 1,64E-01 7,20E-04 
Down Time 
[h/year] 
2,90E+02 X 4,15E+00 5,70E+00 2,50E-02 
Average Down 
Time [h] 
3,68E+01 X 1,91E+01 3,48E+01 3,47E+01 
(Table 9 continues next page) 
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Table 9 (cont.) 1hr Logistic Delay Time: Unavailability (Q), Expected Number of Failures (ENF), Downtime [h/year], 
Average Downtime [h].  
Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – 1 hr Logistic Delay Time 
Typical Parameter 
Damage Class (nominal flow percentage) 
66% 50% 33% Bypass 0% 
2: N-MOCO-
RP 
Q X 2,26E-03 X 4,18E-04 1,84E-06 
ENF [occ/year] X 4,88E-01 X 1,04E-01 4,60E-04 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 1,98E+01 X 3,66E+00 1,61E-02 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 4,05E+01 X 3,51E+01 3,50E+01 
2a: 4-MOCO-
RP 
Q 3,64E-03 X 1,95E-05 4,71E-04 2,06E-06 
ENF [occ/year] 7,77E-01 X 8,08E-03 1,14E-01 5,00E-04 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
3,19E+01 X 1,71E-01 4,13E+00 1,80E-02 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
4,10E+01 X 2,11E+01 3,62E+01 3,61E+01 
3: 2-TUCO-
RN 
Q X 1,14E-01 X 4,16E-03 1,83E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X 7,44E+00 X 4,24E-01 1,86E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 9,98E+02 X 3,65E+01 1,60E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 1,34E+02 X 8,60E+01 8,62E+01 
4: 2-MOCO-
RN 
Q X 3,60E-02 X 7,45E-04 3,26E-06 
ENF [occ/year] X 2,56E+00 X 1,32E-01 5,77E-04 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 3,15E+02 X 6,52E+00 2,86E-02 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 1,23E+02 X 4,95E+01 4,95E+01 
5: 2-TUCO-
RT 
Q X X X 1,02E-02 5,72E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 2,50E+00 1,41E-02 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 8,95E+01 5,01E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 3,58E+01 3,54E+01 
(Table 9 continues next page) 
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Table 9  (cont.) 1hr Logistic Delay Time: Unavailability (Q), Expected Number of Failures (ENF), Downtime [h/year], 
Average Downtime [h].  
Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – 1 hr Logistic Delay Time 
Typical Parameter 
Damage Class (nominal flow percentage) 
66% 50% 33% Bypass 0% 
6: 2-MOCO-
RT 
Q X X X 1,41E-03 7,48E-06 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 3,25E-01 1,73E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 1,23E+01 6,56E-02 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 3,80E+01 3,78E+01 
7-1-TUCO-
RN 
Q X X X 5,89E-02 2,63E-04 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 3,79E+00 1,66E-02 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 5,16E+02 2,31E+00 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 1,36E+02 1,39E+02 
8-1-MOCO-
RN 
Q X X X 1,84E-02 8,10E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 1,35E+00 5,91E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 1,61E+02 7,10E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 1,20E+02 1,20E+02 
LNG 
Q 2,75E-03 5,58E-03 1,23E-05 X 1,76E-04 
ENF [occ/year] 2,49E-01 2,11E+00 2,16E-03 X 4,60E-02 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
2,40E+01 4,88E+01 1,08E-01 X 1,54E+00 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
9,64E+01 2,31E+01 4,99E+01 X 3,36E+01 
Source : Fioravanti e t al., 2019. 
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Table 10.  24h Logistic Delay Time: Unavailability (Q), Expected Number of Failures (ENF), Downtime [h/year], Average 
Downtime [h]. 
Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – 24 hr Logistic Delay Time 
Typical Parameter 
Damage Class (nominal flow percentage) 
66% 50% 33% Bypass 0% 
1: N-TUCO-
RP 
Q X 3,46E-02 X 1,39E-03 6,58E-06 
ENF [occ/year] X 5,07E+00 X 2,65E-01 1,31E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 3,03E+02 X 1,22E+01 5,76E-02 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 5,96E+01 X 4,59E+01 4,39E+01 
1a: 4-TUCO-
RP 
Q 5,52E-02 X 1,32E-03 1,08E-03 4,76E-08 
ENF [occ/year] 8,12E+00 X 3,65E-01 1,67E-01 7,35E-06 
Down Time 
[h/year] 
4,84E+02 X 1,16E+01 9,46E+00 4,17E-04 
Average Down 
Time [h] 
5,96E+01 X 3,17E+01 5,67E+01 5,67E+01 
2: N-MOCO-
RP 
Q X 3,67E-03 X 6,96E-04 3,07E-07 
ENF [occ/year] X 4,99E-01 X 1,06E-01 4,69E-05 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 3,21E+01 X 6,09E+00 2,69E-03 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 6,44E+01 X 5,76E+01 5,73E+02 
2a: 4-MOCO-
RP 
Q 5,94E-03 X 5,09E-05 7,72E-04 3,38E-08 
ENF [occ/year] 8,06E-01 X 1,32E-02 1,14E-01 5,01E-06 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
5,20E+01 X 4,46E-01 6,76E+00 2,96E-04 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
6,46E+01 X 3,38E+01 5,93E+01 5,91E+01 
3: 2-TUCO-
RN 
Q X 1,31E-01 X 5,77E-03 2,54E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X 7,44E+00 X 4,94E-01 2,16E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 1,14E+03 X 5,06E+01 2,22E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 1,54E+02 X 1,02E+02 1,03E+02 
(Table 10 continues next page) 
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Table 10  (cont.) 24h Logistic Delay Time: Unavailability (Q), Expected Number of Failures (ENF), Downtime [h/year], 
Average Downtime [h]. 
Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – 24 hr Logistic Delay Time 
Typical Parameter 
Damage Class (nominal flow percentage) 
66% 50% 33% Bypass 0% 
4: 2-MOCO-
RN 
Q X 4,24E-02 X 5,77E-03 2,54E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X 2,56E+00 X 4,94E-01 2,16E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 3,72E+02 X 5,06E+01 2,22E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 1,45E+02 X 1,02E+02 1,03E+02 
5: 2-TUCO-
RT 
Q X X X 1,14E-03 5,02E-06 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 1,40E-01 6,14E-04 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 1,00E+01 4,39E-02 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 7,15E+01 7,15E+01 
6: 2-MOCO-
RT 
Q X X X 2,31E-03 1,22E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 3,33E-01 1,77E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 2,02E+01 1,07E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 6,06E+01 6,05E+01 
7-1-TUCO-
RN 
Q X X X 6,81E-02 3,06E-04 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 3,80E+00 1,66E-02 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 5,96E+02 2,68E+00 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 1,57E+02 1,61E+02 
8-1-MOCO-
RN 
Q X X X 2,19E-02 9,64E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 1,36E+00 5,94E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 1,92E+02 8,45E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 1,41E+02 1,42E+02 
LNG 
Q 3,48E-03 1,12E-02 1,95E-05 X 3,08E-04 
ENF [occ/year] 2,54E-01 2,13E+00 2,73E-03 X 5,40E-02 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
3,05E+01 9,83E+01 1,71E-01 X 2,70E+00 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
1,20E+02 4,61E+01 6,25E+01 X 5,01E+01 
Source : Fioravanti e t al., 2019. 
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Table 11.  168h Logistic Delay Time: Unavailability (Q), Expected Number of Failures (ENF), Downtime [h/year], Average 
Downtime [h]. 
Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – 168 hr Logistic Delay Time 
Typical Parameter 
Damage Class (nominal flow percentage) 
66% 50% 33% Bypass 0% 
1: N-TUCO-
RP 
Q X 1,16E-01 X 8,06E-03 4,09E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X 5,62E+00 X 5,45E-01 2,90E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 1,02E+03 X 7,06E+01 3,59E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 1,81E+02 X 1,30E+02 1,24E+02 
1a: 4-TUCO-
RP 
Q 1,66E-01 X 1,33E-02 4,07E-03 1,83E-05 
ENF [occ/year] 9,01E+00 X 1,20E+00 2,07E-01 9,70E-04 
Down Time 
[h/year] 
1,45E+03 X 1,17E+02 3,57E+01 1,60E-01 
Average Down 
Time [h] 
1,61E+02 X 9,71E+01 1,72E+02 1,65E+02 
2: N-MOCO-
RP 
Q X 1,28E-02 X 2,52E-03 1,13E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X 5,68E-01 X 1,16E-01 5,25E-04 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 1,12E+02 X 2,21E+01 9,86E-02 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 1,97E+02 X 1,91E+02 1,88E+02 
2a: 4-MOCO-
RP 
Q 2,15E-02 X 5,81E-04 2,65E-03 1,16E-05 
ENF [occ/year] 9,96E-01 X 4,67E-02 1,15E-01 5,04E-04 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
1,88E+02 X 5,09E+00 2,32E+01 1,02E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
1,89E+02 X 1,09E+02 2,02E+02 2,02E+02 
3: 2-TUCO-
RN 
Q X 2,26E-01 X 1,90E-02 8,41E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X 7,44E+00 X 9,07E-01 3,97E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 1,98E+03 X 1,67E+02 7,37E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 2,66E+02 X 1,84E+02 1,86E+02 
(Table 11 continues next page) 
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Table 11  (cont.) 168h Logistic Delay Time: Unavailability (Q), Expected Number of Failures (ENF), Downtime [h/year], 
Average Downtime [h]. 
Corrective + Preventive Maintenance – 168 hr Logistic Delay Time 
Typical Parameter 
Damage Class (nominal flow percentage) 
66% 50% 33% Bypass 0% 
4: 2-MOCO-
RN 
Q X 8,11E-02 X 4,10E-03 1,80E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X 2,56E+00 X 1,92E-01 8,41E-04 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X 7,11E+02 X 3,59E+01 1,58E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X 2,77E+02 X 1,87E+02 1,88E+02 
5: 2-TUCO-
RT 
Q X X X 5,71E-02 3,24E-04 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 2,63E+00 1,48E-02 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 5,00E+02 2,84E+00 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 1,90E+02 1,92E+02 
6: 2-MOCO-
RT 
Q X X X 8,27E-03 4,35E-05 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 3,87E-01 2,02E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 7,24E+01 3,81E-01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 1,87E+02 1,89E+02 
7-1-TUCO-
RN 
Q X X X 1,22E-01 5,59E-04 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 3,84E+00 1,68E-02 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 1,07E+03 4,90E+00 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 2,79E+02 2,91E+02 
8-1-MOCO-
RN 
Q X X X 4,34E-02 1,93E-04 
ENF [occ/year] X X X 1,40E+00 6,15E-03 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
X X X 3,80E+02 1,69E+00 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
X X X 2,71E+02 2,75E+02 
LNG 
Q 8,28E-03 4,61E-02 1,04E-04 X 1,60E-03 
ENF [occ/year] 2,84E-01 2,27E+00 6,54E-03 X 1,04E-01 
Downtime 
[h/year] 
7,26E+01 4,03E+02 9,12E-01 X 1,41E+01 
Average 
Downtime [h] 
2,55E+02 1,78E+02 1,39E+02 X 1,35E+02 
Source : Fioravanti e t al., 2019. 
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The results above lend themselves to interpolation for other logistic delay times and are particu larly useful 
bearing in mind that most accidents and failures in compressor stations are not caused by a single incident of 
equipment malfunction or operator failure but are generally a result of a chain of events and e rrors that 
interact and/or accumulate to lead to a catastrophic failure. These failure events are extremely d iff icult to  
predict using the common single-degree-of-freedom analysis as they are caused by multiple factors and 
events that are systematically related to each other (Moore et al. 2003). 
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6 Pipelines 
Pipelines are the most frequently used mean for transporting gas over long d istances. P ipelines are only 
displaced by LNG cargoes for very long distances, particularly when sources and consumption areas are 
separated by seas or oceans (Qatar – Europe, Nigeria – Europe or USA –  Europe,  for example) , and for 
destination flexibility reasons. Normally, natural gas, as it is when extracted from reservoirs, is not suitable for 
pipeline transportation or commercial use before being processed. Pipelines set their specifications for the 
specific quality of natural gas. In any case, natural gas must be processed in order to remove unwanted water 
vapour, solids, or other contaminants and to get those hydrocarbons that have a higher value as separate 
products.  
Pipelines designed to transport gas over long distances are always made of steel in order to stand the h igh 
pressure required to make effective and efficient such transport. Typically they are d ivided in  two types : 
Transit and transmission pipelines. Transit pipelines are designed for transporting natural gas over very long 
distances, crossing several countries and having few connection  po ints with national systems,  and are 
sometimes operated by operators other than the ones of the countries that they cross. Transmission pipelines 
are designed to transport gas over long distances within a country. Transit pipelines typically operate at ve ry 
high pressure, higher in general than transmission pipelines. Along the pipelines compressor stations are 
located to pressurise gas and push it efficiently, and valves are used to isolate sections and re -direc t f lows 
conveniently. Pipelines play also an important role as gas storages that provide intra-day flexibility. Pushing 
gas into a network when there is not much consumption increases the quantity of gas in  the  system and 
increases its average pressure. This gas is readily available when consumption increases.  
Unfortunately, pipelines, like any other element of the natural gas network, are subject to  contingencies of 
different types, produced by different causes such as corrosion, external interference, as for example due to  
digging works, and construction defects, among others. In this section we put the focus on incidents that may 
take place in the natural gas transit and transmission pipelines, and on the best available data sources for 
estimating failure probabilities of those pipelines in the European Union. 
6.1 The EGIG database on Gas Pipeline Incidents 
Seventeen European gas transmission operators of fifteen countries (four teen EU MS and Switzerland; 
originally, when the group started activities, only six operators) have been collecting data concerning incidents 
in gas transmission and transit natural gas pipelines since 1970,  although the group formally started 
operating as such in 1982. The size of the operated network when the Group was established was around 
30,000 km, and it has grown over the years to a size slightly above 140,000 km due to the natural 
development of the network and to the increase in the number of partners . The European Gas p ipeline 
Incident data Group (EGIG) has published so far 10 reports summarizing the main statistics  and f indings,  
although it does not make public the raw data. The last one, the 10th EGIG reports covers the period 1970 –  
2016. This section provides a summary of the most relevant information in that report (EGIG 2018) and the 
way to use it. 
These reports, and particularly the last one, provide the best available aggregated information about failures 
in the European natural gas transport pipeline system. The members of the group report all sort of incidents 
that involve unintentional gas releases from pipes that are made of steel, onshore, work at a Maximum 
Operational Pressure (MOP) of 15 barg and are located outside the boundaries of facilities (thus no incident is 
reported from pipelines inside the limits of facilities such as LNG regasification  terminals or compressor 
stations). Moreover, incidents are not reported either if the pipelines are in gas production lines or assoc iated 
to components such as valves, regulators, etc. 
Figure 13 shows the age of the pipelines in the reporting network per reporting year and per age segment. A 
few comments con be made on this picture. Firstly, the vast majority of the reporting network was dep loyed 
between 1964 and 2003, with the period 1964-1973 as the one when the reported network inc reased the 
most. A significant fraction of the network, larger than 10,000 km, was older than 53 years (deployed before 
1964) by the time of the last reporting year (2016). A small fraction was even older than 63 years.      
The designed reporting system involves useful information about the pipelines where the incident takes place, 
such as the diameter, operational pressure, wall thickness and year of construction, among others. Probably 
the most useful information reported is related two characteristics of the incidents : 1) the s ize of the  
associated leak, and 2) the initial cause of the incident.  
The size of the associated leak is classified in three groups: 
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 Pinhole/crack: hole with an effective diameter smaller or equal to 2 cm. 
 Hole: hole with an effective diameter larger than 2 cm and smaller or equal to the p ipe diameter. 
 Rupture: hole with a diameter larger than the pipeline diameter.  
The initial cause of the incident is classified in the following five types:  
 External interference. 
 Corrosion. 
 Construction defect / material failure 
 Ground movement 
 Other / unknown 
Over the years the Group has accumulated empirical evidence about the gas network system. One way to  
measure this experience, which in statistical terms is equivalent to the sample size, is  the  exposure of the 
system. The exposure is obtained by multiplying the length of the network (km) by the time during which it 
has been in service (yr). This operation / measure may be calculated for all or for any part of the network, as 
for example for all pipelines with a diameter below 17’’ (17 inches). In the first case it is called total system 
exposure, in the second case it is called partial system exposure. At the time of the publication  of the 10th 
EGIG report, the total system exposure accumulated over the entire period of data collection  (1970 -2016) 
was of 4.41 x 106 km·yr. This value is obtained by adding the heights of all the bars in Figure 13. 
Figure 13 - Length of the reporting network per year of construction and reporting year.  
 
Source : 10th EGIG report (EGIG 2018). 
6.2 Pipeline failure frequency 
The main measure of reliability of the network, or of a part of it, is the failure frequency, which is  the  ratio  
between the number of failures in a period of time and the exposure of (part of) the network associated to  
that period. The failure frequency may be estimated for different categories (cause of the incident, size of the 
leak, etc.), and for different time periods. Failure frequencies are called “Primary” if they re fe r to the entire 
network and “Secondary” if they refer only to a part of the network. 
Figure 14 shows the evolution of the Primary failure frequency for the entire period (until each specific time) 
and for 5-year rolling windows. The ordinates of the blue curve are calculated by d ividing the number of 
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incidents until a given year (included) by the total system exposure until that year (included). The ordinates of 
the green curve are calculated by dividing the number incidents in the last five years for each year (the year 
considered and the four years before) by the total system exposure in those five years . By defin ition , the 
ordinates of the green curve can be computed only starting in 1974. Both curves start to d iverge in  1975. 
Both curves show a steady decrease of the failure frequency over time. This decrease is certainly re lated to 
the improvement of maintenance practices, the development of anticorrosion technologies as for example 
cathodic protection, and the obligation in some countries to digitalise the gas transmission network layout and 
the obligation to consult this information before initiating any digging works. 
Figure 14 - Evolution of the P rimary failure frequency over time. 
 
Source : 10th EGIG report (EGIG 2018). 
Table 12 provides, most likely, the most interesting information for a general practitioner of Risk Assessments 
of gas networks. It contains six periods of reference (first column) and for each of these periods, we can see 
the number of incidents (third column), the total system exposure (fourth column) and the Primary fa ilure 
frequency per 1,000 km and yr for each corresponding period (fifth column). Additionally, the second column 
provides the length in years of each period.  
When performing a Risk Assessment of a gas transmission network, it is important to know probabilities like 
the probability of having a failure in a given pipeline with a given length along a period of one  year,  o r 
knowing the expected number of pipeline failures in the entire, or part of a, gas network. In the first case we 
would proceed in the following manner. Let us assume that we are analys ing the case of a 200 km long 
pipeline. The failure frequency for such a pipeline may be estimated as 
𝐹200 𝑘𝑚 = 0.000165 𝑘𝑚
−1𝑦𝑟−1 ∙ 200 𝑘𝑚 = 0.033 𝑦𝑟−1  
This frequency may be taken as our best estimate of the probability of failure per year for the mentioned 
pipeline. For this estimation we have used the primary failure frequency correspoinding to period 2007-2011. 
Regarding the second case, let us asume thet the network under study is 20,000 km long. If we want to know 
what is the expected number of failures per year in such a network, we follow the same procedure, obtain ing 
a best estimate of  
   
𝑁20000 𝑘𝑚 = 0.000165 𝑘𝑚
−1𝑦𝑟−1 ∙ 20000 𝑘𝑚 = 3.3 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑦𝑟−1  
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Table 12. P rimary failure frequencies over different time periods. 
Period 
Interval 
[years] 
Number of 
incidents 
Total system 
exposure – 103 km·yr 
Primary failure 
frequency per 103 km·yr 
1970-1976 7 years 223 290 0.768 
1977-1986 10 years 420 680 0.618 
1987-1996 10 years 305 910 0.335 
1997-2006 10 years 210 1,140 0.184 
2007-2011 5 years 111 674 0.165 
2012-2016 5 years 97 716 0.136 
Source : JRC based on Table 9 of 10 th EGIG report (EGIG 2018). 
 
If we observe the table, we will see that values are reported for six successive, non-overlapp ing periods of 
different time length (7, 10, 10, 10, 5 and 5 years). The last column, which provides the result of dividing the 
values in the third column by values in the fourth column, shows that the actual failure  frequencies have 
dramatically decreased over time. Nevertheless, this is a subjective appreciation that has to be confirmed with 
some statistical tests. We have proceeded in a similar manner as we d id with t he incidents in  the LNG 
terminals (see page 33, footnote 4). Firstly we compared periods 1970-1976 and 1977-1986,  1977-1986 
and 1987-1996, and 1987-1996 and 1997-2006. Among these three tests, the first delivered a  P-value of 
0.016, and the other two were smaller than 10-4 which indicate clearly significant statistical d ifferences 
between the four periods considered. Thus, the significance of the decrease in  the period 1970 -2006 is 
confirmed. Then we made the corresponding tests among the periods 1997-2006 and 2007-2011, 2007-
2011 and 2016, and 1997-2006 and 2011-2016. In these cases we found the corresponding P-values of 
0.36, 0.16 and 0.014. If we adopt the typical threshold of 0.05, we conc lude that there are statistically 
significant differences between periods 1997-2006 and 2011-2016, but not among the other two groups of 
periods. In this situation of steady slow decrease, where the failure frequencies of both extreme time periods 
are different of each other, but not different any of them from the failure frequency for the intermediate 
period, it is not easy either to suggest a single value as best estimate representative of nowadays s ituation. 
One possibility would be to take as best estimate the value 0.165, and values 0.136 and 0.184 as optimistic  
and pessimistic estimates respectively. See Annex 4 for details on all these tests of hypothesis.    
As in the case of LNG terminals GIIGNL database, we have not had access to the original data,  on ly to  the 
aggregated results presented in the 10th EGIG report. This precludes any analys is  of the homogeneity of 
spread of incidents over the length of the pipelines, which could help identifying reporting networks that have 
either higher or lower frequencies of failures than average. In the absence of this information, the estimates 
suggested in the previous paragraph are reasonable for a generic European pipeline. One more point to stress 
is that a substantial fraction of the European national networks do not report to EGIG. In the case of operators 
of those networks, they should be careful before using these estimates and should check if reported data are  
representative for the situation of their networks. Finally, the authors of this document find the EGIG reports  
very useful and encourage transmission system operators of European networks to start data collection and 
reporting. 
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7 Conclusions 
According to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 concerning measures to safeguard the security of  gas supply, 
Member States have to develop their national gas risk assessments and contribute to  the regional risk 
assessments of the Risk Groups they are included in. These activities demand the  co lle ction of a large 
quantity of information about key facilities of the concerned countries, their operation,  fai lure modes and , 
whenever possible, probabilities of failure. This study is a modest contribution to  p rovide some of this  
information to EU Member States that have to meet these obligations of the Regulation.  
In this report we have performed a review of the main facilities of the EU gas transmission network. We have 
addressed LNG regasification terminals, UGS facilities, compressor stations and pipelines. In some cases we 
have done an inventory of facilities, as it is the case of UGS and LNG facilities, although in other cases like the 
one of compressor stations we have focused on a significant number of them which has allowed us to extract 
some information of interest to use in RAs.  
Regarding UGS facilities, we have provided a picture of the existing types (aquifers, depleted f i les and salt 
caverns), their key components and characteristics. Annex I contains an inventory of these facilities in the EU. 
We have also identified information from two surveys that allow to provide failure frequencies for wel ls and 
for storage cavities. Failure frequencies per site or well are in the range 8.3·10-6 - 6·10-3 yr-1. 
Regarding LNG facilities, we have identified main types of facilities (on-shore, and off-shore of three types:  
gravity based structure, floating storage and regasification unit, and transport and regasification vessel) . We 
have also shown the way these terminals operate and have provided an inventory of terminals in the EU (see 
Annex II) and a short summary of each facility. Main initiating events of failures have been identified, typically 
related to the unloading of LNG from the vessel, the LNG tanks loading and unloading and the actual storage, 
the recondenser and vaporizer section, the boil-off recovery, the send-out and also  external sources. The 
analysis of incidents recorded in a project developed by GIIGNL in the period 1965-2007 has allowed us to  
suggest failure rates per site in the range 0.14 – 0.45 yr-1 with a central estimate of 0.25 yr-1. 
The work done on Compressor Stations has allowed us to show the main types, characteristics and operation 
of these facilities. This has been the case where a real inventory has been completely impossible due  to the 
lack of exhaustive public and commercial information. Nevertheless, a number of frequent type s of 
compressor stations (8 types in total) has been identified in a recent study and reported in this document. The 
study mentioned reports for each type of compressor station the different possible damage states in terms of 
remaining CS capacity (2/3 capacity, 50% capacity, 1/3 capacity, bypass and 0% capac ity) . Key re liability 
parameters are provided for each CS type, damage state and for three different logistic delays (one hour, one 
day and one week): the unavailability (yr-1), the expected number of incident per year, the downtime (h·yr -1) ,  
and the average downtime (h). Interpolations of the four reliability magnitudes are poss ible for d ifferent 
logistic times between one hour and one week. 
Finally, a summary of the main types of failures of pipelines (transmission lines with maximum operating 
pressure above 15 barg) and likely reasons has been provided. The analysis of some of the information in the 
10th EGIG report has also allowed us to provide some advice about reasonable failure frequencies of pipelines. 
The failure frequencies per 1,000 km of pipeline range suggested is 0.136 – 0.184 yr-1, with a central value of 
0.165 yr-1. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Inventory of UGS facilities of Europe 
Table A.1. Inventory of EU UGS facilities. 
Country Facility/Location Type Operator Status 
Working 
gas 
(technical) 
TWh 
Withdrawal 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Injection 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Access 
regime 
Austria 
Haidach Depleted field Astora operational 10.44 104.59 90.16 nTPA 
Haidach Depleted field GSA operational 19.99 198.18 177.60 nTPA 
Schönkirchen/Reyersdorf Depleted field OMV Gas Storage operational 20.72 260.35 176.28 nTPA 
Tallesbrunn Depleted field OMV Gas Storage operational 4.52 43.39 33.90 nTPA 
VGS OMV Gas Storage Pool Depleted field OMV Gas Storage operational 25.24 303.74 210.18 nTPA 
Aigelsbrunn Depleted field RAG.Energy.Storage operational 1.47 13.58 13.58 nTPA 
Haidach 5 Depleted field RAG.Energy.Storage operational 0.18 5.42 5.42 nTPA 
Nussdorf/Zagling Depleted field RAG.Energy.Storage operational 3.26 40.73 32.64 nTPA 
Puchkirchen/Haag Depleted field RAG.Energy.Storage operational 12.22 141.10 141.10 nTPA 
RAG Storage  (storage group) Depleted field RAG.Energy.Storage operational 17.12 200.84 192.75 nTPA 
7 Fields Depleted field Uniper Energy Storage operational 19.42 242.69 161.81 nTPA 
Belgium Loenhout Aquifer Fluxys operational 9.00 169.5 88.14 rTPA 
Bulgaria Chiren Depleted field Bulgartransgaz operational 6.27 36.20 34.10 rTPA 
Croatia Okoli Depleted field PSP operational 5.81 60.57 45.43 rTPA 
Czech 
Republic 
Dolni Dunajovice Depleted field innogy Gas Storage operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Háje Other innogy Gas Storage operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Lobodice Aquifer innogy Gas Storage operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Štramberk Depleted field innogy Gas Storage operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Třanovice Depleted field innogy Gas Storage operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Tvrdonice Depleted field innogy Gas Storage operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
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Country Facility/Location Type Operator Status 
Working 
gas 
(technical) 
TWh 
Withdrawal 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Injection 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Access 
regime 
VGS innogy virtual storage 
(storage group) 
Other innogy Gas Storage operational 28.71 422.29 315.50 nTPA 
Uhřice Depleted field MND Gas Storage operational 3.08 107.21 57.67 nTPA 
Dambořice Depleted field Moravia Gas Storage operational 2.61 78.20 46.92 nTPA 
Dolni Bojanovice Depleted field SPP Storage operational 6.12 95.58 74.34 nTPA 
Denmark 
Lille Torup Salt cavern Gas Storage Denmark operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Stenlille Aquifer Gas Storage Denmark operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
VGS GSD gas storage Aquifer Gas Storage Denmark operational 10.35 194.40 100.80 nTPA 
France 
Saline: Etrez  Salt cavern Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Saline: Manosque Salt cavern Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Saline: Tersanne/Hauterives Salt cavern Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
VGS Storengy Saline Salt cavern Storengy operational 12.2 642.00 136.00 nTPA 
SEDIANE: Beynes Profond Aquifer Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
SEDIANE: Beynes Supérieur Aquifer Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
SEDIANE: Saint-Illiers-la-Ville Aquifer Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
VGS Storengy Sediane Aquifer Storengy operational 11.65 277.00 146.00 nTPA 
VGS SEDIANE B: Gournay-sur-
Aronde 
Aquifer Storengy operational 13.40 248.00 112.00 nTPA 
SEDIANE LITTORAL: Céré-la-
Ronde 
Aquifer Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
SEDIANE LITTORAL: Chémery Aquifer Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
VGS Storengy SEDIANE LITTORAL Aquifer Storengy operational 33.20 416.00 260.00 nTPA 
SERENE Nord: Cerville Aquifer Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
SERENE Nord: Germigny-sous-
Coulombs 
Aquifer Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
SERENE Nord: Saint-Clair-sur-Epte  Aquifer Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
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Country Facility/Location Type Operator Status 
Working 
gas 
(technical) 
TWh 
Withdrawal 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Injection 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Access 
regime 
SERENE Nord: Trois-Fontaines 
l'Abbaye 
Depleted Field Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
VGS Storengy Serene Nord Aquifer Storengy operational 16.65 222.00 139.00 nTPA 
SERENE SUD: Céré-la-Ronde Aquifer Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
SERENE SUD: Chémery Aquifer Storengy operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
VGS Storengy SERENE SUD Aquifer Storengy operational 12.90 145.00 91.00 nTPA 
Izaute Aquifer TERÉGA operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Lussagnet Aquifer TERÉGA operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
TERÉGA (storage group ) Aquifer TERÉGA operational 33.11 556.00 342.00 nTPA 
Germany 
Jemgum  Salt cavern astora operational 6.86 145.80 99.90 nTPA 
Rehden Depleted field astora operational 48.62 530.4 344.76 nTPA 
Wolfersberg Depleted field BayernUGS Operational 4.12 65.03 37.93 nTPA 
Etzel Crystal Salt cavern 
Crystal, Friedeburger 
Speicherbetriebsgesellschaft 
Operational 2.42 94.08 54.00 nTPA 
Inzenham-West Depleted field DEA Speicher Operational 4.77 80.64 53.76 nTPA 
Etzel EKB Salt cavern EKB (Etzel-Kavernenbetriebsgesellschaft) Operational 11.20 216.96 122.04 nTPA 
Etzel Salt cavern EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg Operational 2.42 94.08 54.00 nTPA 
Epe Eneco Salt cavern Eneco Operational 1.44 93.60 93.60 nTPA 
Frankenthal Aquifer Enovos Storage Operational 0.89 26.64 6.47 nTPA 
Katharina Salt cavern Erdgasspeicher Peissen Operational 1.82 0 0 nTPA 
EWE-Zone L 
(Nüttermoor/Huntorf) 
Salt cavern EWE Gasspeicher Operational 9.47 246.96 91.73 nTPA 
Jemgum H Salt cavern EWE Gasspeicher Operational 3.98 69.00 55.20 nTPA 
Nüttermoor H-1 Salt cavern EWE Gasspeicher Operational 1.83 69.60 48.72 nTPA 
Nüttermoor H-2 Salt cavern EWE Gasspeicher Operational 1.96 49.68 24.84 nTPA 
Nüttermoor H-3 Salt cavern EWE Gasspeicher Operational 2.69 82.08 41.04 nTPA 
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Country Facility/Location Type Operator Status 
Working 
gas 
(technical) 
TWh 
Withdrawal 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Injection 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Access 
regime 
Nüttermoor L Salt cavern EWE Gasspeicher Operational 0.43 23.52 21.17 nTPA 
Rüdersdorf H Salt cavern EWE Gasspeicher Operational 1.08 32.77 10.66 nTPA 
Etzel EGL Salt cavern Equinor Storage Deutschland Operational 2.21 361.15 210.67 nTPA 
Empelde Salt cavern GHG - Gasspeicher Hannover Operational 3.83 140.76 44.16 nTPA 
Etzel ESE Salt cavern Gas Union Storage Operational 1.58 55.64 31.80 nTPA 
Reckrod Salt cavern Gas Union Storage Operational 1.32 27.60 13.80 nTPA 
Kiel-Rönne Salt cavern Hansewerk Operational 0.24 13.56 5.69 nTPA 
Kraak Salt cavern Hansewerk Operational 2.97 107.52 48.38 nTPA 
Epe L-Gas Salt cavern innogy Gas Storage NWE Operational 1.84 99.14 49.57 nTPA 
Epe NL Salt cavern innogy Gas Storage NWE Operational 2.92 118.87 47.55 nTPA 
Stassfurt Salt cavern innogy Gas Storage NWE Operational 7.29 175.27 83.59 nTPA 
Epe H-Gas Salt cavern innogy Gas Storage NWE Operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Xanten Salt cavern innogy Gas Storage NWE Operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
VGS innEXpool Salt cavern innogy Gas Storage NWE Operational 6.66 325.76 104.02 nTPA 
Epe KGE Salt cavern KGE (Kommunale Gasspeichergesellschaft Epe) Operational 2.17 109.44 41.04 nTPA 
Hähnlein Aquifer MND Gas Storage Germany Operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Stockstadt Aquifer MND Gas Storage Germany Operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
VSG MND GSG Aquifer MND Gas Storage Germany Operational 2.43 61.03 37.97 nTPA 
Eschenfelden Aquifer N-ERGIE Operational 0.23 162.88 52.01 nTPA 
Epe Nuon Salt cavern Nuon Operational 3.01 141.81 70.80 nTPA 
Etzel ESE Salt cavern OMV Gas Storage Germany Operational 5.30 106.80 71.28 nTPA 
Bruggraf-Bernsdorf Salt cavern Ontras Gastransport Operational 0.03 0 0 No TPA 
Bremen-Lesum Salt cavern Stadtwerke Bremen (wesernetz) Operational 0.86 4.14 1.38 nTPA 
Kiel-Rönne Salt cavern Stadtwerke Kiel Operational 0.50 13.68 5.88 nTPA 
Bremen-Lesum Salt cavern Storengy Deutschland Operational 1.60 52.01 24.82 nTPA 
Fronhofen-Trigonodus Depleted field Storengy Deutschland Operational 0.12 8.03 5.35 nTPA 
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Country Facility/Location Type Operator Status 
Working 
gas 
(technical) 
TWh 
Withdrawal 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Injection 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Access 
regime 
Harsefeld Salt cavern Storengy Deutschland Operational 1.24 81.72 24.67 nTPA 
Peckensen Salt cavern Storengy Deutschland Operational 3.93 231.96 84.67 nTPA 
Schmidhausen Depleted field Storengy Deutschland Operational 1.74 40.32 10.75 nTPA 
Uelsen Depleted field Storengy Deutschland Operational 9.78 107.60 81.03 nTPA 
Allmenhausen Depleted field TEP (Thüringer Energie Speichergesellschaft) Operational 0.71 17.11 8.56 nTPA 
Sandhausen Aquifer terranets bw Operational 0.35 12.42 5.52 No TPA 
Etzel EGL Salt cavern Total Etzel Gaslager operational 0.06 1.97 0.89 nTPA 
Epe Trianel Salt cavern TGE (Trianel Gasspeicher Epe) operational 2.23 164.88 82.44 nTPA 
Bierwang Depleted field Uniper Energy Storage operational 9.18 349.44 268.80 nTPA 
Breitbrunn Depleted field Uniper Energy Storage operational 11.11 139.78 67.20 nTPA 
Epe Uniper H-Gas Salt cavern Uniper Energy Storage operational 15.30 465.12 328.32 nTPA 
Epe Uniper L-Gas Salt cavern Uniper Energy Storage operational 4.26 285.12 57.02 nTPA 
Eschenfelden Aquifer Uniper Energy Storage operational 0.44 10.85 5.42 nTPA 
Etzel EGL Salt cavern Uniper Energy Storage operational 11.32 271.68 155.68 nTPA 
Etzel ESE Salt cavern Uniper Energy Storage operational 12.10 396.72 425.64 nTPA 
Etzel ESE Salt cavern VNG Gasspeicher operational 1.40 46.17 28.73 nTPA 
Kirchheiligen Depleted field VNG Gasspeicher operational 2.02 33.68 37.72 nTPA 
Bernburg Salt cavern VNG Gasspeicher operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Bad Lauchstädt Salt cavern VNG Gasspeicher operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
Bad Lauchstädt Depleted field VNG Gasspeicher operational 0 0 0 nTPA 
VGS storage hub Other VNG Gasspeicher operational 23.49 496.15 294.97 nTPA 
Hungary 
Hajdúszoboszló Depleted Field Hungarian Gas Storage operational 17.55 211.86 107.86 rTPA 
Kardoskút Depleted Field Hungarian Gas Storage operational 3.00 31.03 23.01 rTPA 
Pusztaederics Depleted Field Hungarian Gas Storage operational 3.64 31.03 30.82 rTPA 
Zsana Depleted Field Hungarian Gas Storage operational 23.22 299.60 181.90 rTPA 
VGS MFGT Depleted Field Hungarian Gas Storage operational 47.40 617.64 398.74 rTPA 
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Country Facility/Location Type Operator Status 
Working 
gas 
(technical) 
TWh 
Withdrawal 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Injection 
technical 
capacity 
GWh/day 
Access 
regime 
Szöreg-1 Depleted field MMBF operational 20.11 263.90 134.06 rTPA 
Italy 
Cellino Depleted Field Edison Stoccaggio operational 0.03 0 0 rTPA 
Collalto Depleted Field Edison Stoccaggio operational 0.21 37.00 20.09 rTPA 
Cotignola & San Potito Depleted Field Edison Stoccaggio operational 0.24 56.04 61.53 rTPA 
VGS Edison Stoccaggio Depleted Field Edison Stoccaggio operational 11.32 186.64 156.50 rTPA 
Bordolano Depleted Field STOGIT operational 0 0 0 rTPA 
Brugherio Depleted Field STOGIT operational 0 0 0 rTPA 
Cortemaggiore Depleted Field STOGIT operational 0 0 0 rTPA 
Fiume Treste Depleted Field STOGIT operational 0 0 0 rTPA 
Minerbio Depleted Field STOGIT operational 0 0 0 rTPA 
Ripalta Depleted Field STOGIT operational 0 0 0 rTPA 
Sabbioncello Depleted Field STOGIT operational 0 0 0 rTPA 
Sergnano Depleted Field STOGIT operational 0 0 0 rTPA 
Settala Depleted Field STOGIT operational 0 0 0 rTPA 
VGS STOGIT Depleted field STOGIT operational 183.68 2783.07 1582.53 rTPA 
Latvia Inčukalns Aquifer Conexus Baltic Grid operational 24.15 315.00 178.50 rTPA 
Netherlands 
EnergyStock Salt cavern EnergyStock BV operational 3.01 422.04 257.91 nTPA 
Grijpskerk Depleted field NAM operational 27.67 719.33 172.92 No TPA 
Norg (Langelo) Depleted field NAM operational 48.71 742.48 448.75 No TPA 
Bergermeer Depleted field TAQA Gas Storage operational 45.65 554.20 387.36 nTPA 
Alkmaar Depleted field TAQA Piek Gas operational 4.90 352.80 36.00 No TPA 
Poland 
Wierzchowice Depleted Field Gas Storage Poland operational 13.2 105.60 67.20 rTPA 
Kosakowo Salt cavern Gas Storage Poland operational 1.62 107.04 26.76 rTPA 
Mogilno Salt cavern Gas Storage Poland operational 6.57 200.52 106.94 rTPA 
GSF Kawerna Salt cavern Gas Storage Poland operational 8.19 307.56 133.70 rTPA 
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Swarzow Depleted Field Gas Storage Poland operational 1.01 10.40 11.20 rTPA 
Brzeznica Depleted Field Gas Storage Poland operational 1.13 16.10 16.20 rTPA 
Strachocina Depleted Field Gas Storage Poland operational 4.05 37.90 29.70 rTPA 
Husow Depleted Field Gas Storage Poland operational 5.62 64.60 46.70 rTPA 
GSF Sanok Salt cavern Gas Storage Poland operational 11.81 129.80 103.80 rTPA 
Bonikowo Depleted Field PGNiG operational 2.30 27.60 19.32 No TPA 
Daszewo Depleted Field PGNiG operational 0.35 4.37 2.76 No TPA 
Portugal Carriço Salt Cavern REN Armazenagen operational 3.57 85.68 24.00 rTPA 
Romania 
Balanceanca Depleted field Depogaz Ploiești (ex Romgaz) operational 0.55 13.18 10.98 rTPA 
Bilciuresti Depleted field Depogaz Ploiești (ex Romgaz) operational 14.33 152.78 109.13 rTPA 
Cetatea de Balta Depleted field Depogaz Ploiești (ex Romgaz) operational 0.32 1.05 0 rTPA 
Ghercesti Depleted field Depogaz Ploiești (ex Romgaz) operational 1.63 21.40 21.40 rTPA 
Sarmasel Depleted field Depogaz Ploiești (ex Romgaz) operational 9.60 79.04 68.50 rTPA 
Urziceni Depleted field Depogaz Ploiești (ex Romgaz) operational 4.02 50.16 33.44 rTPA 
Târgu Mureş Depleted field Depomures operational 3.15 30.00 19.00 rTPA 
Slovakia 
Láb complex Depleted field Nafta operational 22.28 332.46 292.77 nTPA 
Gajary-Baden Depleted field Nafta operational 6.36 74.25 49.13 nTPA 
Láb 4 Depleted field Pozagas operational 6.95 72.66 72.66 nTPA 
Spain 
Gaviota Depleted Field Enagas operational 18.34 66.30 52.30 rTPA 
Marismas Depleted Field Enagas/Gas Natural Fenosa operational 1.62 4.20 4.20 rTPA 
Serrablo Depleted Field Enagas operational 9.73 79.10 44.20 rTPA 
Yela Aquifer Enagas operational 2.29 64.90 25.60 rTPA 
VGS Enagas Basic UGS Other Enagas operational 31.98 214.50 126.30 rTPA 
Sweden Skallen Rock Cavern Swedegas operational 0.10 11.52 4.32 nTPA 
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United 
Kingdom 
Hill Top Farm (Cheshire) Salt cavern EDF Energy operational 0.57 136.80 0 No TPA 
Hole House Farm Salt cavern EDF Energy operational 0.25 57.00 0 No TPA 
Cheshire (Holford GS) Salt cavern E.ON operational 2.28 250.80 0 No TPA 
Hampshire Depleted field Humbly Grove Energy operational 3.42 79.80 0 No TPA 
Hatfield Moor Depleted field Scottish Power operational 0.80 20.52 20.52 No TPA 
Aldbrough I Salt cavern SSE/Statoil operational 2.17 342.00 311.00 No TPA 
Hornsea (Atwick) Salt cavern SSE operational 2.61 130.00 30.00 nTPA 
Stublach Salt cavern Storengy UK operational 2.41 200.00 160.00 No TPA 
Holford Salt cavern Uniper Energy Storage operational 1.95 238.33 238.33   
Source : Gas Storage Europe, 2018. 
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Annex 2. Inventory of LNG terminals of Europe 
Table B.1. Inventory of EU LNG terminals: Large operational terminals . 
Country 
LNG 
Terminnal 
Start-Up 
Date 
Type Operator Vessel Size 
Storage 
Capacity 
Annual Send-
Out Capacity 
TPA Regime Services 
Belgium Zeebrugge 1987 large onshore Fluxys LNG 266,000 m3 
Current: 380,000 
m3, by 2019: 
560,000 m3 
Current: 9 
bcm/year, by 
2019: 12 
bcm/year 
Regulated TPA 
Regasification, re loading, trans-
shipment, loading of bunkering 
ships, truck loading, small ship 
loading, cooling down and gassing 
up 
France 
Fos Tonkin 1972 large onshore Elengy 
From 7,500 m3 to 
75,000 m3 155,000 m
3 3.4 bcm/year Regulated TPA 
Regasification, re loading, truck 
loading, small ship loading, and 
cooling and gassing up; rail loading 
is be ing considered 
Montoir 1980 large onshore Elengy 
From 65,000 m 
(Medmax) to 
267,000 m3 (Q-
Max) 
360,000 m3, by 
2023: 550,000 
m3 
10 bcm/year Regulated TPA 
Regasification, re loading/ship 
loading, trans-shipment, loading of 
bunkering ships, truck loading, 
cooling and gassing up; rail loading 
is be ing considered 
Fos Cavaou 2010 large onshore Elengy 
From 15,000 m3 
to 267,000 m3 
Current: 330,000 
m3, by 2020: 
550,000 m3 
Current: 8.25 
bcm/year, by 
2020: 16.5 
bcm/year 
Regulated TPA 
Regasification, re loading, ship 
loading, small ship loading, trans-
shipment, truck loading, cooling 
down and gassing up 
Dunkerque 2016 large onshore 
Gaz-Opale (51% 
Dunkerque LNG, 
49% Fluxys) 
From 15,000 m3 
to 267,000 m3 600,000 m
3 13 bcm/year Exempted 
Regasification, re loading, loading 
of bunkering ships and truck 
loading 
Greece Revithoussa 2000 large onshore DESFA (Public 
Gas Corporation) 
Current: 135,000 
m3, by 2018: 
260,000 m3 
Current: 130,000 
m3, by 2018: 
225,000 m3 
Current: 5.2 
bcm/year, by 
2018: 8.25 
bcm/year 
Regulated TPA 
Regasification, truck loading 
storage as unbundled service, 
cooling down and gassing up; 
re loading and loading of bunkering 
ships are under study 
Italy 
Panigaglia 1971 FSRU GNL Italia S.p .A. 
Current: 70,000 
m3, by 2022: 
140,000 m3 
Current: 100,000 
m3, by 2022: 
240,000 m3 
current: 3.5 
bcm/year, by 
2022: 8 
bcm/year 
Regulated TPA 
Regasification; re loading, bunkering 
and truck loading are under study 
Rovigo/Adriatic 2009 large onshore 
Terminale  GNL 
Adriatico Srl. 152,000 m
3 250,000 m3 8 bcm/year 
80% TPA 
exemption for 25 
years 
Regasification 
OLT Toscana 2013 
large offshore 
(offshore 
Gravity Based 
Structure  
(GBS)) 
ECOS (Exmar, 
Frate lli Cosulich) 
  135,000 m3 3.75 bcm/year Regulated TPA Regasification, storage bundle 
Lithuania Klaipėda 2014 FSRU 
Höegh LNG/ 
Klaipėdos Nafta 
160,000 m3 170,000 m3 4 bcm/year Regulated TPA Regasification, bunkering 
 
69 
 
Country 
LNG 
Terminnal 
Start-Up 
Date 
Type Operator Vessel Size 
Storage 
Capacity 
Annual Send-
Out Capacity 
TPA Regime Services 
Malta Delimara 2017 
FSU + onshore 
regasification ElectroGas Malta   125,000 m
3   Regulated TPA Regasification, bunkering 
Netherlands Gate  2011 large onshore 
Gate  terminal B.V. 
(Vopak and 
Gasunie) 
266,000 m3 
Current: 540,000 
m3, by 2018: 
720,000 m3 
Current 12 
bcm/year, by 
2018: 16 
bcm/year 
TPA exemption for 
16 bcm for 20 
years 
Regasification, ship loading, small 
ship loading, cooling down and 
gassing up 
Poland Świnoujście  2016 large onshore Polskie  LNG 216,000 m3 
Current: 320.000 
m3, by 2020: 
480.000 m3 
Current: 5 
bcm/year, by 
2020: 7.5 
bcm/year 
Regulated TPA Regasification, truck loading 
Portugal Sines 2003 large onshore Ren Atlântico  7.6 bcm/year 390,000 m3 
40,000 m3 to 
216,000 m3 
Regulated TPA 
Regasification, ship loading, truck 
loading, cooling down and gassing 
up 
Spain 
Barce lona 1969 large onshore Enagas S.A. 266,000 m3 840,000 m3 17.1 bcm/year Regulated TPA 
Regasification, truck loading, 
cooling down and gassing up; 
loading of bunkering ships is being 
deve loped 
Cartagena 1989 large onshore Enagas S.A. 266,000 m3 619,500 m3 11.8 bcm/year Regulated TPA 
Regasification, ship loading, truck 
loading, small ship loading, cooling 
down and gassing up, trans-
shipment and loading of bunkering 
ships 
Hue lva 1988 large onshore Enagas S.A. 173,400 m3 619,500 m3 11.8 bcm/year Regulated TPA 
Regasification, ship loading, truck 
loading, small ship loading, trans-
shipment, cooling down and 
gassing up; loading of bunkering 
ships is being considered 
Bilbao 2003 large onshore 
Bahía de Bizkaia 
Gas (BBG) 
270,000 m3 450,000 m3 8.8 bcm/year Regulated TPA 
Regasification, truck loading, 
cooling down and gassing up, 
loading of bunkering ships 
Mugardos 2007 large onshore 
Regasificacion del 
Noroeste, S.A. 
(Reganosa) 
266,000 m3 
Current: 300,000 
m3, by 2023: 
500,000 m3 
Current: 3.6 
bcm/year, by 
2023: 7.2 
bcm/year 
Regulated TPA 
(open access) 
Regasification, ship loading, truck 
loading, cooling down and gassing 
up , loading of bunkering ships; 
trans-shipment is under study 
El Muse l 
In 
hibernation 
large onshore Enagas S.A. 266,000 m3 
Current: 300,000 
m3, future : 
600,000 m3 
Current: 7 
bcm/year, by 
2021; 8.8 
bcm/year 
  
Regasification, re loading, truck 
loading; trans-shipment and 
bunkering are under study 
Sagunto 2006 large onshore SAGGAS 267,000 m3 600,000 m3 8.8 bcm/year Regulated TPA 
Regasification, truck loading, ship 
reloading, cooling down and 
gassing up; loading of bunkering 
ships is under study 
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Country 
LNG 
Terminnal 
Start-Up 
Date 
Type Operator Vessel Size 
Storage 
Capacity 
Annual Send-
Out Capacity 
TPA Regime Services 
United 
Kingdom 
Grain 2005 large onshore National Grid 265,000 m3 1,000,000 m3 
Current: 19.5 
bcm/year, by 
2020: 27.5 
bcm/year 
TPA exemption for 
100% for 20 years 
Regasification, ship re loading, 
trans-shipment, truck loading, rail 
loading, cooling down and gassing 
up ; loading of bunkering ships will 
be  available  from 2019 
South Hook 2009 large onshore 
South Hook 
Terminal 
Company Ltd 
250,000 m3 775,000 m3 21 bcm/year 
TPA exemption for 
100% for 25 years Regasification 
Dragon 2009 large onshore 
Dragon LNG 
(She ll and 
Petronas) 
217,000 m3 320,000 m3 7.6 bcm/year 
TPA exemption for 
100% for 25 years Regasification 
Source : (King & Spalding 2018), (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019a) and (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019b). 
 
 
Table B.2. Inventory of EU LNG terminals: Small operational terminals. 
Country LNG Terminal 
Start-Up 
Date 
Type Status Operator Vessel Size 
Storage 
Capacity 
Annual Send-Out 
Capacity 
billion m3(N)/year 
Finland 
Tahkoluoto/Pori  2016 small onshore existing Gasum 20000 28500 0.1 
Tornio Manga  2018 small onshore existing Manga LNG   50000 0.4 
Sweden 
Lysekil  2014 small onshore existing Gasum   30000 0.3 
Nynäshamn  2011 small onshore existing AGA 15000 20000 0.3 
United Kingdom Gibraltar  2019 small onshore existing Gasnor (100% Shell)   5000 0.2 
Source : (King & Spalding 2018), (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019a) and (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019b). 
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Table B.3. Inventory of EU LNG terminals: Under construction. 
Country  Location 
Start-Up 
Date 
Type Status Operator Vessel Size 
Storage 
Capacity 
Annual Send-Out 
Capacity 
billion m3(N)/year 
Belgium Zeebrugge  2019 large onshore expansion Fluxys LNG 266000 566000   
Croatia Krk Island , Omišal 2020 FSRU new facility LNG Croatia   140000 2.6 
Finland Hamina  2020 small new facility Hamina LNG Oy   30000   
Italy 
Oristano - Santa Giusta  2020 small new facility Higas   9000   
Ravena  2021 small new facility Depositi Otaliani GNL 27500 20000   
Poland 
Swinoujscie   2021 large onshore expansion Polskie  LNG 216000   7.5 
Swinoujscie   2023 large onshore expansion Polskie  LNG 216000 480000   
Spain 
Gran Canaria (Arinaga)  2027 large onshore new facility Gascan 140000 150000 1.3 
Tenerife (Arico-
Granadilla)  
2021 large onshore new facility Gascan 140000 150000 1.3 
Source : (King & Spalding 2018), (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019a) and (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019b). 
 
Table B.4. Inventory of EU LNG terminals: P lanned. 
Country  Location 
Start-Up 
Date 
Type Status Operator Vessel Size 
Storage 
Capacity 
Annual Send-Out 
Capacity 
billion m3(N)/year 
Cyprus Vassiliko  2020 FSRU new facility CYGAS   120000-250000 2.4 
Estonia 
Paldiski  ? large  onshore new facility Balti Gaas 175000 160000 2.5 
TallinnLNG  ? mid - large  onshore new facility Liwathon E.O.S.    
4000 to  
50000- 250000 
0.5 
Finland Rauma  ? small new facility AGA   10000   
France 
Fos Cavaou  2022 large onshore expansion Fosmax LNG 267000   11 
Fos Cavaou  2024 large onshore expansion Fosmax LNG 267000 540000 5.5 
Montoir-de-Bretagne  2022 large onshore expansion Elengy 267000   7 
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Country  Location 
Start-Up 
Date 
Type Status Operator Vessel Size 
Storage 
Capacity 
Annual Send-Out 
Capacity 
billion m3(N)/year 
Montoir-de-Bretagne  2024 large onshore expansion Elengy 267000 10000   
Germany 
Brunsbütte l  2022 large onshore new facility Gasunie, Vopak, Oiltanking 267000 240000 8 
LNG Stade GmBh ? large  onshore new facility 
Macquarie  Group Ltd. - 
China Harbour Engineering 
Co 
    5 
Rostock transshipment  ? mid-scale  new facility 
Novatek 49% - Fluxys 
51% 
      
Wilhe lmshaven 2022 FSRU new facility UNIPER with MOL   263000 10 
Greece Alexandroupolis  2021 FSRU new facility Gastrade 170000 170000 6.1 
Ireland 
Cork  ? FSRU new facility NextDecade     4 
Shannon  ? large  onshore new facility Shannon LNG 266000   6.2 
Italy Porto Empedocle (Sicilia)  2022 large onshore new facility Ene l 155000 320000 8 
Latvia 
Kundzinsalas (Riga)  ? large  onshore new facility Kundzinsalas        
Skulte   ? FRU new facility Skulte  LNG Terminal 170000   5 
Netherlands Gate terminal, 
Rotterdam 
? large  onshore expansion Gate  terminal 266000 720000 11 
Poland FSRU Polish Baltic Sea 
Coast 
2025 FSRU new facility Polskie  LNG/GAZ SYSTEM 170000 170000 4.1 
Spain 
Mugardos  2020 large onshore expansion Reganosa 266000     
Mugardos  2022 large onshore expansion Reganosa 266000 320000   
Mugardos  2023 large onshore expansion Reganosa 266000   3.1 
Sweden 
Gävle   ? small new facility Gasum   30000 0.3 
Göteborg  ? small new facility Swedegas 75000 25000 0.5 
United Kingdom 
Isle  of Grain  ? large  onshore expansion Grain LNG 266000 1175000 26.5 
Port Meridian  ? FSRU new facility Port Meridian Energy   170000 5 
Source : (King & Spalding 2018), (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019a) and (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019b). 
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Table B.5. Inventory of EU LNG terminals: Suspended. 
Country  Location 
Start-Up 
Date 
Type Status Operator Vessel Size 
Storage 
Capacity 
Annual Send-Out 
Capacity 
billion m3(N)/year 
United Kingdom Trafigura Teeside  2007 gas port existing (Trafigura) 150000 0 4.2 
Source : (King & Spalding 2018), (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019a) and (Gas Infrastructure Europe 2019b). 
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Annex 3. Tests of hypothesis for the incident frequencies of LNG facilities in the GIIGNL database 
In this annex we develop the hypothesis tests performed to identify what periods in the GIINL database have 
statistically significant different frequencies of incidents and what periods do not show s uch s ign ificant 
differences. We consider that the number of incidents, X, that take place over a given observation period , t1,  
follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λ1 (expected number of incidents per unit of time), and expected 
value λ1·t1. This variable, when the observation period is large enough will converge to a normal d istribution 
with expected value λ1·t1 and variance λ1·t1 (the approximation is considered good enough for λ·t>5) . Thus we 
can write 
𝑋~𝑁(𝜆1𝑡1,𝜆1𝑡1)             [1] 
For another observation period of length t2 and expected number of incidents per unit of time λ2, the random 
variable number of incidents in the period (Y), will follow the corresponding normal distribution  
𝑌~𝑁(𝜆2𝑡2,𝜆2𝑡2)                                                                       [2] 
Thus, the difference between both variables will also follow approximately the normal distribution  
𝑋 − 𝑌~𝑁(𝜆1𝑡1 − 𝜆2𝑡2 ,𝜆1𝑡1 + 𝜆2𝑡2)                                                        [3] 
In section 4.4.5 we report the results of five samples taken over five non-overlapping periods. And we want to 
know if those results are likely to come from different Poisson distributions or from the same. In  order to  
answer this question we will build a statistic that will help us identifying if the sample differences as small as 
to consider that they proceed from the same Poisson distribution, or if the differences do not allow us to keep 
such hypothesis and we have to consider that they come from different Poisson distributions. Plainly 
speaking, we want to know if the number of events observed in two different periods (observed values of X 
and Y) are likely to come from the same Poisson distribution with parameter λ, or if they are d ifferent ( two 
Poisson distributions with expected number of incidents per unit of time λ1 and λ2 respectively). To build such 
a statistic we take into account that from equation [3] we can conclude that 
(𝑋−𝑌)−(𝜆1𝑡1−𝜆2𝑡2)
√𝜆1𝑡1+𝜆2𝑡2
~𝑍                                                                     [4] 
Where Z stands for the standard normal distribution. We want to test the null Hypothesis  
H0: λ=λ1=λ2  
Versus the alternative 
H0: λ1≠λ2  
In the conditions of the null hypothesis equation [4] becomes 
(𝑋−𝑌)−𝜆(𝑡1−𝑡2)
√𝜆(𝑡1+𝑡2)
~𝑍                                                                     [5] 
 Which will be the measure of discrepancy that we will use to test the null hypothesis. In order to effectively 
perform the tests, we will replace X and Y by their observed values in the samples,  x and y,  and we wi ll 
replace λ by its best estimate which is 
?̂? =
𝑥+𝑦
𝑡1+𝑡2
                                                                             [6] 
After some algebra, the statistic is calculated as 
√𝑥 + 𝑦 [
𝑥−𝑦
𝑥+𝑦
−
𝑡1−𝑡2
𝑡1+𝑡2
]                                                                   [7] 
and it is compared with the quantiles of the reference standard normal distribution as in a usual bilateral test. 
Results of all tests of hypothesis performed are shown in table C.1. P_values smaller than 0 .05 take us to 
reject the null hypothesis and consider that there are significant differences between the  frequencies of 
incidents in each pair of considered periods. These cases have been highlighted in red ink.  
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Table C.1. Summary of hypothesis tests performed. 
Periods 1/2 
Sample size 
period 1 (t1) 
[site-yr] 
Sample size 
period 2 (t2) 
[site-yr] 
Number of 
incidents in 
period 1 (x) 
Number of 
incidents in 
period 2 (y) 
Statistic 
(absolute 
value) 
P-value 
1965-1974 
1975-1984 
44 179 15 52 0.435 0.66 
1975-1984 
1985-1994 
179 327 52 94 0.06 0.96 
1965-1974 
1985-1994 
44 327 15 94 0.40 0.68 
1965-1994 
1995-2000 
550 191 161 85 2.75 0.006 
1965-1994 
2001-2007 
550 579 161 82 5.47 < 10-4 
1995-2000 
2001-2007 
191 579 85 82 6.74 < 10-4 
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Annex 4. Tests of hypothesis for the frequencies of incidents in the 10th EGIG report 
This section contains the tests of hypothesis to check what periods in the 10 th EGIG report may be considered 
to have the same frequencies of incidents and what periods have definitely different frequencies of incidents. 
The tests performed follow the same rationale as the ones performed in Annex 3. The results are contained in 
Table D.1. P-values smaller than 0.05 take us to reject the null hypothesis  and consider that there  are  
significant differences between the frequencies of incidents in each pair of considered periods. These cases 
have been highlighted in red ink. 
Table D.1. Summary of hypothesis tests performed. 
Periods ½ 
Sample size 
period 1 (t1) 
[thousands 
of km·yr] 
Sample size 
period 2 (t2) 
[thousands 
of km·yr] 
Number of 
incidents in 
period 1 (x) 
Number of 
incidents in 
period 2 (y) 
Statistic 
(absolute 
value) 
P-value 
1970-1976 
1977-1986 
290 680 223 420 2.42 0.016 
1977-1986 
1987-1996 
680 910 420 305 8.17 < 10-4 
1987-1996 
1997-2006 
910 1,140 305 210 6.73 < 10-4 
1997-2006 
2007-2011 
1,140 674 210 111 0.92 0.36 
2007-2011 
2012-2016 
674 716 111 97 1.41 0.16  
1997-2006 
2011-2016 
1140 716 210 97 2.45 0.014  
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